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GOING  ROGUE:  MOBILE  RESEARCH
APPLICATIONS  AND  THE  RIGHT  TO  PRIVACY
Stacey A. Tovino*
INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical involving a woman with a progressive neurologi-
cal condition.1  The woman, who wishes to advance the scientific understand-
ing of her condition, volunteers to participate in a disease-progression
research study led by an independent scientist.2  The research study requires
each participant to download and use a mobile application (“mobile app”)
that was designed by the independent scientist and that collects a number of
data elements, including first and last name, date of birth, race, ethnicity,
diagnosis, medications, family history, and real-time information regarding
balance, gait, vision, cognition, and other measures of disease progression.3
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1 See generally Robin Ray & Anne Kavanagh, Principles for Nursing Practice: Parkinson’s
Disease, Multiple Sclerosis and Motor Neurone Disease, in LIVING WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS AND
DISABILITY 301 (Esther Chang & Amanda Johnson eds., 3d ed. 2018) (discussing progres-
sive neurological conditions).
2 See, e.g., Carrie Arnold, Going Rogue, SCIENCE (May 17, 2013), https://www.science
mag.org/careers/2013/05/going-rogue (reporting the story of Ethan Perlstein, an inde-
pendent scientist who engages in scientific research without affiliation to a university, phar-
maceutical company, research institute, or government agency and without public
funding).
3 See generally Sarah Moore et al., Consent Processes for Mobile App Mediated Research:
Systematic Review, J. MED. INTERNET RES. MHEALTH & UHEALTH, Aug. 2017, at 3, https://
155
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Assume that, during the research study, the independent scientist
decides to share the participants’ identifiable data with other researchers
worldwide without the participants’ prior notification or authorization.4  Fur-
ther assume the scientist sells the participants’ names, addresses, and diagno-
ses to a healthcare marketing company, also without the participants’ prior
notification or authorization.5  Moreover, assume a hacker accesses the par-
ticipants’ data as the data travels from the participants’ smartphones to the
scientist’s contracted, backend data collector,6 resulting in additional, unau-
thorized disclosures of the participants’ identifiable data.7  Finally, assume
the scientist neither notifies the participants of these unauthorized disclo-
sures nor provides instructions to the participants regarding how they can
minimize potential economic, dignitary, and psychological harms associated
with the unauthorized disclosures.8
Although hypothetical, this fact pattern is based on several recent
enforcement actions9 involving healthcare providers that failed to maintain
mhealth.jmir.org/2017/8/e126/ (discussing Apple’s ResearchKit and Android’s Research-
Stack, two open-source frameworks that any scientist can use to create a mobile research
app); ResearchKit and CareKit, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/researchkit/ (last visited
Aug. 31 2019) (listing more than a dozen mobile research apps designed using
ResearchKit); About the Study, MPOWER, https://parkinsonmpower.org/about (last visited
Aug. 31, 2019) (describing a mobile-app-mediated research study that monitors the symp-
toms and progression of Parkinson’s disease).
4 See generally Moore et al., supra note 3, Multimedia Appendix 1, Excel sheet Confi-
dentiality, col. L Open Data Sharing for Scientific Discovery, https://mhealth.jmir.org/api/
download?filename=FE0f53d825af51a87c76412316cee8cd.xlsx&alt_name=7014-105713-1-
SP.xlsx (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (noting that some mobile-app-mediated researchers
share research data with researchers outside the primary research team as well as with
qualified researchers worldwide).
5 See, e.g., Bonnie Kaplan, Selling Health Data: De-Identification, Privacy, and Speech, 24
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 256 (2015) (discussing privacy and other legal issues
raised by the sale of health data); I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech,
and Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 JAMA 1141 (2019) [hereinafter, Cohen & Mello, Big
Data] (discussing the market for health data).
6 See, e.g., Moore et al., supra note 3, Multimedia Appendix. 1, Excel sheet Confidenti-
ality, col. H Backend Collector, https://mhealth.jmir.org/api/download?filename=FE0f
53d825af51a87c76412316cee8cd.xlsx&alt_name=7014-105713-1-SP.xlsx (noting that some
mobile-app-mediated researchers contract with a third party to provide backend data col-
lection services).
7 See, e.g., Douglas Busvine & Stephen Nellis, Security Flaws Put Virtually All Phones,
Computers at Risk, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/security-flaws-
put-virtually-phones-035449033.html (discussing security flaws that allow hackers to steal
sensitive information from smart phones).
8 Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2018), with id. § 164.404(c)(1) (requiring
HIPAA-covered entities, following the discovery of a breach of unsecured protected health
information (uPHI), to notify each individual whose uPHI has been, or is reasonably
believed to have been, accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed as a result of the breach).
9 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESOLUTION AGREEMENT WITH MAN-
AGEMENT SERVICES ORGANIZATION WASHINGTON, INC. 1–2 (2010), https://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/msoresagr.html (requiring Management Ser-
vices Organization Washington, Inc. (MSO) to pay HHS $35,000 following MSO’s unau-
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the privacy and security of individually identifiable health information col-
lected during clinical encounters, thereby violating applicable federal pri-
vacy, security, and breach notification rules (“Rules”) that implement the
administrative simplification provisions within the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, as amended by the Health Infor-
mation Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).10  As
background, the HIPAA Rules were designed to protect the privacy and
security of individually identifiable health information created or maintained
in the healthcare and health insurance contexts and to assist patients and
insureds in protecting themselves in the event of a privacy or security
breach.11  Although HIPAA authorizes the federal government to impose
civil and criminal penalties for violations of the HIPAA Rules,12 the HIPAA
Rules are limited in application to (1) health plans, healthcare clearing-
houses, and those healthcare providers that transmit health information in
electronic form in connection with standard transactions, including health
thorized disclosure of electronic PHI (ePHI) for marketing purposes); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., RESOLUTION AGREEMENT WITH MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH SYSTEM 1–2
(2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/mhhs_ra_cap.pdf (requiring Memorial
Hermann Health System (“Memorial”) to pay $2.4 million to the Federal Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) following Memorial’s unauthorized disclosure of pro-
tected health information (PHI)); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESOLUTION
AGREEMENT WITH METRO COMMUNITY PROVIDER NETWORK 1–2 (2017), https://
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/mcpn-ra-cap.pdf (requiring Metro Community Provider
Network (“Metro”) to pay HHS $400,000 following Metro’s failure to implement policies
and procedures designed to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations,
thereby allowing a hacker to access the ePHI of 3200 Metro patients); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., RESOLUTION AGREEMENT WITH PRESENCE HEALTH NETWORK 1–2, 4 (2017),
[hereinafter PRESENCE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
presence-ra-cap.pdf (requiring Presence Health Network (“Presence”) to pay HHS
$475,000 following Presence’s failure to timely notify individuals of the breach of their
uPHI).
10 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S Code),
amended by Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).  HHS’s privacy regulations, which implement section 264(c) of
HIPAA, are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 [hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule].
HHS’s security regulations, which implement section 262(a) of HIPAA (42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d–2(d)(1)), are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 [hereinafter HIPAA Security
Rule].  HHS’s breach notification regulations, which implement section 13402 of HITECH
(42 U.S.C. § 17932), are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 [hereinafter HIPAA Breach
Notification Rule].
11 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534, .302–.318, .400–.414 (setting forth the privacy, secur-
ity, and breach notification obligations of covered entities and business associates under
the HIPAA Rules).
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012) (establishing criminal penalties for violations of the
HIPAA Rules); HIPAA, supra note 10, § 242 (establishing civil penalties for violations of
the HIPAA Rules); and HITECH, supra note 10, § 13410(d) (revising the amount of the
civil penalties authorized by HIPAA).
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insurance claims (“covered entities”);13 and (2) persons or entities that
access or use protected health information (PHI) to provide certain services
to, or to perform certain functions on behalf of, covered entities (“business
associates”).14
The HIPAA Rules do not regulate a number of individuals and institu-
tions that collect, use, or disclose individually identifiable health information,
including many independent scientists,15 citizen scientists,16 and patient
researchers,17 as well as some mobile-app developers and data storage com-
panies that support them.18  As a result, the voluminous and diverse data
13 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining covered entity); id. § 160.102(a) (applying
the HIPAA Rules to covered entities).
14 See id. § 160.103 (defining business associate); id. § 160.102(b) (applying the
HIPAA Rules to business associates).
15 See, e.g., Amber Dance, Solo Scientist, 543 NATURE 747, 747–49 (2017) (reporting the
story of Jeffrey Rose, an independent scientist who conducts research “without the benefits
of a conventional, bricks-and-mortar employer”).
16 See, e.g., Lisa M. Rasmussen, When Citizens Do Science: Stories from Labs, Garages, and
Beyond, 9 NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS 1, 1–4 (2019) (providing background information
regarding the conduct of citizen science); Mark A. Rothstein et al., Citizen Science on Your
Smartphone: An ELSI Research Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 897 (2015) (explaining
that the term citizen scientist originally referred to “non-professionals assisting professional
scientists by contributing observations and measurements to ongoing research enter-
prises”; also explaining that the term “now includes nonprofessionals who conduct scien-
tific experiments of their own design independent from professional scientists”—clarifying
that citizen science has been made possible by “online crowdsourcing, big data capture
strategies, and computational analytics,” among other technological developments); Todd
Sherer, Parkinson’s Disease at 200, SCI. AM. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://blogs.scientificameri
can.com/guest-blog/parkinsons-disease-at-200/ (referencing technology that citizens use
to participate in research investigating Parkinson’s disease).
17 See, e.g., Paul Wicks et al., Accelerated Clinical Discovery Using Self-Reported Patient Data
Collected Online and a Patient-Matching Algorithm, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 411, 411–14 (2011)
(analyzing data reported on a website by patient researchers with ALS who experimented
with lithium carbonate).
18 See, e.g., Cohen & Mello, Big Data, supra note 5, at 231 (“HIPAA is a 20th-century
statute ill equipped to address 21st-century data practices.”); I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M.
Mello, HIPAA and Protecting Health Information in the 21st Century, 320 JAMA 231, 232 (2018)
[hereinafter Cohen & Mello, HIPAA] (“HIPAA ‘attaches (and limits) data protection to
traditional health care relationships and environments.’  The reality . . . is that HIPAA-
covered data form a small and diminishing share of the health information stored and
traded in cyberspace.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and
Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 69 (2014))); Rothstein et al., supra
note 16, at 899 (“[R]esearch undertaken by an individual or entity that is not a HIPAA-
covered entity, such as a citizen scientist, is not required to follow federal privacy rules.”);
Mark A. Rothstein, The End of the HIPAA Privacy Rule? 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 352
(2016) (“Among the reasons for the Privacy Rule’s disrepute, especially among privacy
advocates, is its limited coverage; it applies only to ‘covered entities’ . . . .”); Nicolas P.
Terry & Tracy D. Gunter, Regulating Mobile Mental Health Apps, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 136,
139–40 (2018) (“[Mobile medical applications] tend to be developed outside of traditional
healthcare spaces with the result that they exist in a lightly regulated, ‘HIPAA-free zone.’”
(citation omitted)).
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collected by some independent scientists who use mobile apps to conduct
health research may be at risk for unregulated privacy and security
breaches,19 leading to dignitary, psychological, and economic harms for
which the participants have few legally enforceable rights or remedies.20
Many academic and practitioner discussions regarding health-related big
data have suggested new federal laws or amendments to existing federal laws
in an attempt to create comprehensive privacy and security protections for
otherwise unprotected data.21  It is not clear, however, that the federal gov-
ernment has the desire or capacity to enforce expanded or new laws in this
area.  In a recent study, for example, the author found that a timely filed
consumer complaint involving an actual violation of the HIPAA Rules over
which the Office for Civil Rights within the Federal Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) has jurisdiction has a one-tenth of one percent
(0.1%) chance of triggering a settlement or civil money penalty.22  The
author also showed that in those few cases that go to settlement or penalty,
the federal government takes a significant amount of time—more than seven
years in some cases—to execute the settlement agreement or to impose the
19 See, e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(explaining that the mobile app Yelp exceeded the scope of its users’ consent when it
uploaded its users’ contacts data without explicit permission); Zeynep Tufekci, The Latest
Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/
opinion/strava-privacy.html?rref...ule=stream_unit&version=search&contentPlacement=
3&pgtype=collection (reporting on the mobile exercise app Strava, which inadvertently
revealed the secret locations of American military bases and service members).
20 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Issues in Big Data Health Research, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 425, 426–27 (2015) (discussing physical and dignitary harms associated with the
loss of privacy in the context of big-data health research).
21 See, e.g., Cohen & Mello, HIPPA, supra note 18, at 232 (noting that federal options
include expanding the application of the HIPAA Rules and crafting new federal legisla-
tion); Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Health Data and Privacy in the Digital Era, 320 JAMA 233,
234 (2018) (referencing federal guidance that could be expanded to apply to mobile-app
developers and social media); James Swann, Your Fitbit Steps May Not Be Protected by Federal
Law, BLOOMBERG L. (May 30, 2018) (“It’s almost certain that the federal government will
look to regulate health information that’s not subject to HIPAA, Thora Johnson, a [promi-
nent] health-care attorney . . . , told Bloomberg Law.”).  A number of data privacy and/or
security bills that would expand HIPAA or create new legislation have recently been intro-
duced to Congress.  As of this writing, however, not one has been enacted. See, e.g., Pro-
tecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 1842, 116th Cong. (2019) (directing the HHS
Secretary to promulgate regulations to help strengthen privacy and security protections for
consumers’ personal health data that is collected, processed, analyzed, or used by con-
sumer devices, services, applications, and software); Data Care Act of 2018, S.3744, 115th
Cong., § 3 (2018) (establishing duties of “care, loyalty, and confidentiality” for online ser-
vice providers that handle personal data).  A number of voluntary data privacy and security
guidelines have also been recently released for the health industry. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES: MANAGING THREATS
AND PROTECTING PATIENTS (2018), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/405d/
Documents/HICP-Main-508.pdf (describing voluntary cybersecurity practices for health
care organizations of all types and sizes, including local clinics and large hospital systems).
22 Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1406 (2019).
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civil money penalty.23  The author concluded that the federal desire and
capacity to enforce the HIPAA Rules appear to be low, resulting in a lack of
timely attention to the privacy and security rights of individuals.24
This Article furthers this line of research by investigating whether non-
sectoral state laws may serve as a viable source of privacy and security stan-
dards for mobile health research participants and other health data subjects
until new federal laws are created or enforced.  In particular, this Article (1)
catalogues and analyzes the nonsectoral data privacy, security, and breach
notification statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia; (2) applies
these statutes to mobile-app-mediated health research conducted by inde-
pendent scientists, citizen scientists, and patient researchers; and (3) pro-
poses substantive amendments to state law that could help protect the privacy
and security of all health data subjects, including mobile-app-mediated
health research participants.25
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background information
regarding mobile apps and their use by independent scientists, citizen scien-
tists, and patient researchers as well as conventional researchers who fall
outside traditional sources of privacy and security regulation.  After reviewing
federal and international data privacy, security, and breach notification stan-
dards, Part II shows why some citizen scientists, independent researchers, and
patient researchers, as well as the mobile-app developers and data storage
and processing companies that support them, are not subject to such
regulation.
Part III of this Article reports the results of a comprehensive survey of
state privacy, security, and breach notification laws.  In particular, Part III
investigates the presence or absence in the statutes of each state and the
District of Columbia of nonsectoral data privacy and security standards,
including prior notification of and authorizations for the use and disclosure
of individually identifiable data; administrative, technical, and physical data
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 Prior legal scholarship relating to mobile health research and independent science
has focused on the lack of application of federal and state health industry and health
research standards. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Mobile Research Applications and State Research
Laws, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2019); Stacey A. Tovino, Privacy and Security Issues
in mHealth Research, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2019); Mark A. Rothstein, John T.
Wilbanks, Laura M. Beskow, Kathleen M. Brelsford, Kyle B. Brothers, Megan Doerr, Cathe-
rine M. Hammack, Michelle L. McGowan & Stacey A. Tovino, Unregulated Health Research
Using Mobile Devices: Ethical Considerations and Policy Recommendations, J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(forthcoming 2019).  Prior scholarship examining mobile health apps generally tends to
focus on mobile health app quality, safety, and efficacy. See, e.g., Natalie R. Bilbrough,
Comment, The FDA, Congress, and Mobile Health Apps: Lessons from DSHEA and the Regulation
of Dietary Supplements, 74 MD. L. REV. 921 (2015) (discussing mobile health app malfunc-
tion, substandard health advice, and potential physical harms); Saabira Chaudhuri, Fertility
Apps Are Multiplying. But Are They Reliable?, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/fertility-apps-are-multiplying-but-are-they-reliable-1527182930 (ques-
tioning the efficacy of mobile fertility apps).
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safeguards; and breach notification to individuals, government agencies, and
consumer reporting agencies.  Part III applies these rights and protections,
when they exist, to individuals who conduct and support mobile-app-medi-
ated health research.  Part III finds that all jurisdictions have at least one
potentially applicable breach notification statute, more than two-thirds of
jurisdictions have at least one potentially applicable data security statute, and
more than one quarter of jurisdictions have at least one potentially applica-
ble data privacy statute.  These findings suggest that states have the current
or potential infrastructure to protect the privacy and security of mobile
health research data and other health-related data that is not protected by
traditional, federal health laws such as the HIPAA Rules.
Taking a nonsectoral approach to data privacy and security, this Article
concludes by proposing amendments to breach notification statutes as well as
content for states that lack generally applicable data privacy and security stat-
utes.  If adopted, these proposals could create cross-industry privacy and
security protections that will benefit all health data subjects, including partici-
pants in mobile-app-mediated health research.  This Article also considers
the challenges and opportunities associated with both intra- and interindus-
try data privacy and security regulation.  Although sectoral approaches to pri-
vacy and security made sense even a quarter of a century ago, the time has
come for generally applicable forms of data protection.
I. HEALTH RESEARCH AND MOBILE APPLICATIONS
Mobile apps are a fast-growing category of software typically installed on
personal smartphones and wearable devices.26  Used for a wide range of
health-related activities, including fitness, health education, health predic-
tion, diagnosis, healthcare delivery, treatment support, chronic disease man-
agement, health research, disease surveillance, and epidemic-outbreak
tracking, among other activities, mobile apps have tremendous versatility and
promise.27  Mobile apps are currently used in almost every area of medicine
26 See, e.g., Terry & Gunter, supra note 18, at 136 (providing background information
regarding mobile health apps).
27 See, e.g., Valerie Gay & Peter Leijdekkers, Bringing Health and Fitness Data Together for
Connected Health Care: Mobile Apps as Enablers of Interoperability, 17 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 37
(2015), http://www.jmir.org/2015/11/e260/ (discussing fitness and health uses of mobile
apps as well as the aggregation of such uses); Deborah Lupton & Annemarie Jutel, ‘It’s Like
Having a Physician in Your Pocket!’ A Critical Analysis of Self-Diagnosis Smartphone Apps, 133
SOC. SCI. & MED. 128, 128–35 (2015) (analyzing diagnostic uses of mobile apps, including
the effects such apps have on the physician-patient relationship and medical authority in
relation to diagnosis); Elaine O. Nsoesie et al., New Digital Technologies for the Surveillance of
Infectious Diseases at Mass Gathering Events, 21 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 134,
134–140 (2015) (focusing on disease surveillance uses of mobile apps and other digital
technologies); Ben Underwood et al., The Use of a Mobile App to Motivate Evidence-Based Oral
Hygiene Behaviour, 219 BRIT. DENTAL J. E2 (2015) (reporting the results of a study assessing
user perceptions of an oral health app that provides education and behavioral support
related to oral health).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-NOV-19 8:43
162 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
and health, including dermatology,28 maternal, newborn, and child health,29
and communicable and contagious diseases,30 just to name a few.
This Article focuses on the use of mobile apps for health-related
research, concentrating in particular on mobile-app-mediated research con-
ducted or participated in by independent scientists, citizen scientists, and
patient researchers.  As background, an independent scientist, also known as
a rogue or lone scientist, is an individual who engages in scientific research
without affiliation to a university, hospital, pharmaceutical company,
research institute, government agency, or other third party.31  A citizen scien-
tist, also known as a community scientist, crowd scientist, or amateur scientist,
is a member of the general public who engages in scientific work, sometimes
in collaboration with or under the direction of a professional, affiliated scien-
tist, and the scientist’s academic or other institution.32  Citizen scientists also
include non–professionally trained scientists who independently conduct
their own experiments, frequently with the assistance of mobile apps, online
crowdsourcing, computational analytics, and other technologies made possi-
ble by big data.33  A patient researcher is a current or former patient who
initiates or assists research at any stage of the research process, including
establishing the research agenda, designing the research protocol, collecting
data, or disseminating research results.34  Mobile apps have been tremen-
dously helpful to independent scientists, citizen scientists, and patient
researchers, as well as conventional scientists who fall outside traditional reg-
ulation (collectively, independent scientists), in the conduct of a wide range
28 See, e.g., Ann Chang Brewer et al., Mobile Applications in Dermatology, 149 JAMA DER-
MATOLOGY 1300, 1300–04 (2013) (identifying and categorizing 209 unique dermatology-
related mobile apps).
29 See, e.g., Francis Dzabeng et al., Community Health Workers’ Experiences of Mobile Device-
Enabled Clinical Decision Support Systems for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in Developing
Countries: A Qualitative Systematic Review Protocol, JBI DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS & IMPLE-
MENTATION REP., Sept. 2016, at 57 (synthesizing evidence regarding the experiences of
community health workers of “mobile device-enabled clinical decision support systems”
interventions designed to support maternal, newborn, and child health in low- and middle-
income countries).
30 See, e.g., Jamie I. Forrest et al., Mobile Health Applications for HIV Prevention and Care in
Africa, 10 CURRENT OPINION HIV & AIDS 464 (2015) (conducting a literature review of
mobile health interventions for HIV prevention and care in Africa).
31 See, e.g., James Lovelock, We Need Lone Scientists, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/james-lovelock-we-
need-lone-scientists-9215280.html (comparing affiliated scientists, who work in large cor-
porations or for the government, with lone (or independent) scientists who work alone in
their own laboratories).
32 Citizen Scientist, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
33513?redirectedFrom=citizen+scientist#eid316597459 (defining citizen scientist).
33 See Rothstein et al., supra note 16, at 897 (explaining the development of the term
citizen scientist).
34 See generally Jenny Leese et al., Evolving Patient-Researcher Collaboration: An Illustrative
Case Study of a Patient-Led Knowledge Translation Event, 9 J. PARTICIPATORY MED. 3 (2017),
https://jopm.jmir.org/2017/1/e13 (discussing patient engagement in research).
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of health research projects.35  Four illustrative mobile apps that involve inde-
pendent scientists in one form or another are discussed below.
A. Kinsey Reporter
The Kinsey Reporter mobile apps, available for iOS in the Apple App
Store and Android on Google Play, collect real-time, anonymous data about
sexual health, sexual behaviors, and other intimate behaviors reported by
their “citizen sex scientists.”36  Kinsey Reporter communicates the collected
data to KinseyReporter.org, a global mobile platform designed by researchers
based in Bloomington, Indiana, that aggregates, maps, and shares the data
with the public.37  Some of the data collected by Kinsey Reporter is quite
sensitive.  With respect to sexual health, collected data includes hormonal
contraception use, methods, and effects, including irregular bleeding, vagi-
nal dryness, missed menses, breast tenderness, severe headache, nausea, and
anxiety.38  With respect to unwanted sexual behavior, collected data includes
reports of physical injuries as well as data confirming whether the recipient
of the unwanted behavior reported the behavior to a legal authority.39
Although Kinsey Reporter collects neither the name (nor any type of user
identity) nor precise geolocation of its citizen sex scientists,40 Kinsey
Reporter does collect data regarding the city, state, and country (e.g., “Semi-
nole, Florida, US”) where the reported sexual health issue or intimate behav-
35 See, e.g., Elizabeth Klemick, Mobile Apps for Citizen Science, SMITHSONIAN SCI. EDUC.
CTR., https://ssec.si.edu/stemvisions-blog/mobile-apps-citizen-science (last visited Sept. 1,
2019) (“An abundance of mobile apps makes participation in citizen science projects eas-
ier than ever and allows data entry in the field.”).
36 See Clayton A. Davis et al., Citizen Science for Sex Research 1 (Feb. 16, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.04878.pdf (“‘Citizen sex scientists’
submit reports, each consisting of one or more surveys, after participating in or observing
sexual activity.  Surveys cover topics such as flirting, sexual activity, unwanted experience,
consumption of pornography, and hormonal birth control side effects.”); Kinsey Reporter,
APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/kinsey-reporter/id533205458 (last visited Aug. 28,
2019); Kinsey Reporter, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kin-
sey.android (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
37 See Home, KINSEY REPORTER, https://kinseyreporter.org/#/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2019).
38 See Explore, KINSEY REPORTER, https://kinseyreporter.org/#/explore (last visited
Aug. 30, 2019) (depicting data about hormonal birth control use and effects).
39 See id. (depicting data about sexual aggression).
40 See Privacy Policy, KINSEY REPORTER, https://kinseyreporter.org/#/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2019) [hereinafter Kinsey Reporter Privacy Policy] (stating that the data collected and
shared by Kinsey Reporter is anonymous); id. (“The Application does not collect or trans-
mit detailed geolocation data from the GPS technology within your mobile device.”). See
generally Davis et al., supra note 36 (discussing the research goals of Kinsey Reporter); Kin-
sey Reporter: Citizen Observers Report on Sexual Behavior and Experiences As Well As Share, Explore
and Visualize the Accumulated Data, SCI. AM. (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.
com/citizen-science/kinsey-reporter/.
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ior occurred, as well as the age, gender, and internet protocol (IP) address of
the reporting citizen sex scientist.41
One of the stated goals of Kinsey Reporter is to reveal how sexual health,
norms, and behaviors vary depending on geography.42  Hormonal birth con-
trol, for example, reportedly affects women living in different geographic
areas differently.  To unpack those differences, Kinsey Reporter collects data
regarding the effects of hormonal birth control together with the location of
the reporting citizen sex scientist.43  A second stated goal of Kinsey Reporter
is to stimulate discussion regarding the challenges and opportunities associ-
ated with using citizen-science platforms to collect data about sensitive health
issues and intimate behaviors.44
B. ActiveDay
Independent scientists use mobile apps to collect a wide variety of
health-related data, not just data related to sexual health and intimate behav-
ior.  For example, the ActiveDay mobile app, available for iOS in the Apple
App Store, was designed by Tidyware, LLC, for research on occupational-
health-and-safety technology, including fall detection and prevention.45  In
particular, ActiveDay uses the sensors in its participating, citizen scientists’
smartphones to monitor physical activity and detect irregular movements.46
When ActiveDay detects an irregular movement, it sends a message to the
citizen scientist asking whether the movement was caused by a fall or whether
the citizen scientist was just walking or running or had simply dropped the
citizen scientist’s phone.47  ActiveDay then sends the irregular movement
and the citizen scientist’s classification of the irregular movement to storage
for research and development relating to occupational safety.48  According
41 Kinsey Reporter Privacy Policy, supra note 40 (“The Application obtains the informa-
tion you provide[, including] . . . survey responses; approximate date and time that the
survey response is submitted; and the city, state/region, or country location that you desig-
nate when completing the survey.”); Explore: Top Surveys in Seminole, Florida, US, KINSEY
REPORTER, https://kinseyreporter.org/#/explore?country=2&state=75&city=376 (sharing
data showing that a female data entrant located in Seminole, Florida, reported hormonal
birth control use).
42 Davis et al., supra note 36, at 4 (explaining the importance of geography to the
research study).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2.
45 ActiveDay—Activity Study, APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/activeday-activity-
study/id1183046259 (last visited Sep. 1, 2019) (describing the ActiveDay app).
46 Id. (describing the data gathered by ActiveDay).
47 Screenshot of Movement Detection Message from ActiveDay to Stacey Tovino (on
file with author) (asking whether the user fell or dropped her phone, or whether she was
walking or running, after she intentionally dropped her phone from the second floor of
her house to the first floor).
48 Active Day—Activity Study 2.0.2 License Agreement, APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/
app/activeday-activity-study/id1183046259 (follow “License Agreement”) (last visited Oct.
13, 2019).
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to ActiveDay’s privacy policy, citizen scientists who use ActiveDay grant
Tidyware and its successors, business affiliates, and independent contractors
the permanent, irrevocable ability to use the collected data for research pur-
poses relating to occupational health and safety.49
Tidyware is a small, privately held company located in Bellevue, Wash-
ington, incorporated under Washington law.50  In addition to ActiveDay,
Tidyware also owns and operates FallSafety Pro, a mobile app designed to
protect the physical safety of individuals who work at height,51 including
painters, roofers, linemen, oil field workers, service technicians, framers, and
window cleaners.52  To this end, FallSafety Pro collects each app user’s name,
phone number, email address, and real-time GPS location, as well as the
name, phone number, and email address of the individual’s emergency con-
tact.  FallSafety Pro then uses hardware and software in each user’s smart
phone to detect whether the user has fallen and to provide GPS-enabled
directions to emergency contacts and first responders in the event of a fall.53
FallSafety Pro also collects data regarding the number of times each user has
fallen.54
C. PatientsLikeMe
Kinsey Reporter and ActiveDay rely on citizen scientists who volunteer
their data for sexual-health and occupational-safety research, respectively.  In
some mobile-app-mediated research studies, patients actually initiate and
direct the research.  Some background is necessary before proceeding with
an example of this type of patient-led research.  In 2008, a group of Italian
scientists published the results of a small, pilot study investigating whether
lithium, typically used as a mood stabilizer for patients with mental illness,
may delay the progression of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).55  ALS is a
49 Id.
50 Tidyware LLC, MANTA, https://www.manta.com/c/mb42sxd/tidyware-llc (last vis-
ited Sep. 1, 2019) (“Tidyware LLC is a privately held company in Bellevue, WA [that was]
. . . established in 2012 and incorporated in Washington.  Current estimates show this
company has an annual revenue of [$]204,157 and employs a staff of approximately 3.”).
51 E-mail from Philip Carmichael, CEO of FallSafety, to Stacey Tovino, (May 31, 2018,
4:20 PM) (on file with author) (“Our team created FallSafety Pro specifically to address the
safety needs of those who work at height.  We’ve tuned the solution to detect larger falls
and impacts, that occur on jobsites, while filtering out smaller events that could trigger
false alarms.”)
52 How It Works, FALLSAFETY, https://www.fallsafetyapp.com/how-it-works (last visited
Sept. 1, 2019).
53 See id.  After the app detects a possible fall, it gives the user forty-five seconds to
respond and cancel the emergency response. Id.  If the response is canceled, the user is
asked questions to determine what triggered the app’s motion detector; if the response is
not canceled, the app notifies emergency personnel. Id.
54 See Privacy Policy, FALLSAFETY, https://www.fallsafetyapp.com/privacy (last visited
Sept. 1, 2019) [hereinafter FallSafety Privacy Policy].
55 Francesco Fornai et al., Lithium Delays Progression of Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 105
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2052 (2008).
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progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells in the brain
and the spinal cord and that typically leads to death within three to five years
of diagnosis.56  The authors of the small pilot study formally concluded that
lithium does delay the progression of ALS in human patients.57
As news of the Italian study traveled, many patients with ALS wanted to
try lithium to see if their disease progressions could be delayed.  In particu-
lar, a group of 149 patients with ALS who had registered on a free, health
data sharing website—PatientsLikeMe.com—obtained and then experi-
mented with lithium carbonate off label for at least two months, although
some patients experimented as long as twelve months.58  Using an online,
lithium-specific, data collection tool, the patients reported a number of data
elements, including demographic data, site of ALS onset, lithium-treatment
start and stop dates, and functional-impairment scores over time in the
domains of speech, swallowing, walking, arm function, and respiratory func-
tion.59  A published study, conducted internally at PatientsLikeMe, formally
concluded that lithium had no effect on ALS disease progression at twelve
months.60  The study also suggested, however, that “data reported by patients
over the internet may be useful for accelerating clinical discovery and evalu-
ating the effectiveness of drugs already in use.”61
The 149 ALS patients referenced above submitted their data to Patient-
sLikeMe using an online data collection tool, not a mobile app.  However,
PatientsLikeMe, which is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has
health data sharing apps available for iOS in the Apple App Store and
Android on Google Play.62  Using these apps, patients can share their data,
including user identifications, photos, email addresses, demographic infor-
mation, ages, ethnicities, races, diagnoses, genetic information, symptoms,
laboratory results, and treatment regimes, among other data elements.63
Indeed, registered users located in the United States, European Union, and
56 See, e.g., Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DIS-
ORDERS & STROKE (June 2013), https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-
Education/Fact-Sheets/Amyotrophic-Lateral-Sclerosis-ALS-Fact-Sheet (describing the
disease).
57 See Fornai et al., supra note 55, at 2056 (“Our study indicates that lithium delays ALS
progression in human patients.”).
58 Wicks et al., supra note 17, at 411–14.
59 Id. at 411, 412 & fig.1.
60 Id. at 411 (“At 12 months after treatment, we found no effect of lithium on disease
progression.”).
61 Id.
62 PatientsLikeMe, APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/patientslikeme/id9552722
81 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); Patients Like Me, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/store/
apps/details?id=com.patientslikeme.android&hl=EN_US (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); see
Contact Us, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme.com/about/contact (last visited
Aug. 30, 2019) (listing a Cambridge, Massachusetts, headquarters address).
63 See Jim Edwards, PatientsLikeMe Is More Villain than Victim in Patient Data “Scraping”
Scandal, CBS NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/patientslikeme-is-
more-villain-than-victim-in-patient-data-scraping-scandal/ (listing the types of data ele-
ments collected by PatientsLikeMe).
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other jurisdictions are currently sharing data with respect to more than 2800
health conditions, including sensitive and stigmatizing conditions such as
colon cancer, genital herpes, HIV, obesity, paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol-
use disorder, and drug-use disorder.64  According to the app’s privacy policy,
PatientsLikeMe  aggregates and organizes the data shared by its member
patients and then reshares and/or sells it to universities, pharmaceutical
companies, hospital systems, insurance companies, and regulatory bodies for
research and other purposes.65
D. MyFitnessPal
Under Armour Inc. is an American apparel company that manufactures
athletic footwear as well as sports and casual clothing.66  Although Under
Armour’s global headquarters are located in Baltimore, Under Armour has a
number of international offices, including in Amsterdam, Guangzhou, Hong
Kong, Jakarta, London, Mexico City, Munich, Panama City, Paris, Sa˜o Paulo,
Santiago, Seoul, Shanghai, and Toronto.67  Founded in 1996 by Kevin Plank,
a former University of Maryland football player, Under Armour apparel is
well known for keeping its users cool, dry, and stylish throughout the course
of a game, practice, or workout.68  In addition to apparel, however, Under
Armour also owns and operates a number of mobile apps, including MyFit-
nessPal.69  MyFitnessPal allows users to track their fitness and health by enter-
ing a wide range of health data relating to food, exercise, and body weight, as
64 Conditions, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme.com/conditions (last vis-
ited Aug. 30, 2019) (“Members are tracking more than 2,800 conditions on PatientsLike
Me.”); Find Patients: Italy, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme.com/patients/
searches/detail_search (follow “Additional filters” under “Filter patients by:”; then follow
“Italy” under “Country”) (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (showing that patients from Italy and
other EU member states are sharing data).
65 Does PatientsLikeMe Sell My Information?, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://support.patients
likeme.com/hc/en-us/articles/201245770-Does-PatientsLikeMe-sell-my-information- (last
visited Aug. 30, 2019) (“Yes, we do.  We create partnerships between you, our patients, and
the companies that are developing products to help you.  To do that, we take the informa-
tion you entrust to us and sell it to the companies that can use that data to improve or
understand products or the disease market.”); Privacy Policy, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://
www.patientslikeme.com/about/privacy (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Patient-
sLikeMe Privacy Policy] (“PatientsLikeMe frequently partners with other institutions to con-
duct research.  These Partners include, but are not limited to: universities, pharmaceutical
companies, hospital systems, insurance companies, and regulatory bodies . . . .”).
66 Under Armour Inc, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/company-pro
file/UA (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
67 See Under Armour Headquarters and Office Locations, CRAFT, https://craft.co/under-
armour/locations (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
68 The UA Story, M ADVANTAGE (last visited Oct. 13, 2019), https://static.umterps.com/
custompages/maryland_advantage/phone/the-ua-story.html.
69 See Under Armour, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id
=under+Armour&hl=EN_US (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (showing that Under Armour
owns and operates a number of mobile apps, including Under Armour, Under Armour
Record, and UA Play); Under Armour Privacy Policy, UNDER ARMOUR (Apr. 20, 2018), https:/
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well as identifiers such as names, usernames, hashed passwords, physical
addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, payment card information, and
approximate or precise locations.70  Available in the Apple App Store for iOS
and on Google Play for Android,71 MyFitnessPal states in its privacy policy
that it uses entered data for research purposes and that it discloses the data
for advertising, marketing, and other purposes.72
On March 25, 2018, Under Armour learned that an unauthorized third
party accessed MyFitnessPal user data, including usernames, email addresses,
and hashed passwords.73  Four days later, on March 29, Under Armour pub-
licly announced that hackers stole the data of more than 150 million MyFit-
nessPal users.74  The following day, March 30, Under Armour notified these
users, including this author, of the data breach through a formal process
called breach notification.75  In the breach notification email, Under
Armour provided information regarding how MyFitnessPal users could pro-
tect themselves, including by changing their passwords, reviewing their
accounts for suspicious activity, being cautious of unsolicited communica-
tions, and avoiding clicking on links or downloading attachments from suspi-
cious emails.76  Although MyFitnessPal clearly followed some type of breach
notification policy, it is unclear whether MyFitnessPal had implemented pri-
vacy standards and security safeguards that could have prevented the breach
in the first place.
II. FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
A variety of federal and international legal authorities have been inter-
preted to impose privacy, security, and breach notification obligations on
individuals and institutions that collect, use, or disclose health data in certain
/account.underarmour.com/en-us/privacy (showing that Under Armour additionally
operates MyFitnessPal and other fitness apps).
70 See Under Armour Privacy Policy, supra note 69.
71 MyFitnessPal, APPLE, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/myfitnesspal/id341232718
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019); MyFitnessPal, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.myfitnesspal.android&hl=EN_US (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
72 See Under Armour Privacy Policy, supra note 69.
73 See E-mail from Paul Fipps, Chief Digital Officer, MyFitnessPal, to Stacey Tovino
(Mar. 30, 2018, 5:52 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter MyFitnessPal Data Breach Noti-
fication] (notifying the author that the privacy and security of her own MyFitnessPal data
had been breached).
74 See, e.g., Sara Germano & Maria Armental, Under Armour Discloses Breach Affecting 150
Million MyFitnessPal App Users, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
under-armour-discloses-breach-affecting-150-million-myfitnesspal-app-users-1522362412
(reporting the data breach); Hamza Shaban, Under Armour Announces Data Breach, Affecting
150 Million MyFitnessPal App Accounts, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/29/under-armour-announces-data-breach-af
fecting-150-million-myfitnesspal-app-accounts/?noredirect=ON (same).
75 See MyFitnessPal Data Breach Notification, supra note 73.
76 Id.
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contexts.77  Under federal consumer law, for example, when a company tells
a consumer that the company will safeguard the consumer’s health data but
fails to do so, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can take enforcement
action, forcing the company to keep its promise.78  Although the FTC Act
does not contain particular data privacy and security standards, section 5 of
the FTC Act does prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”79  The FTC
has relied on this broad language in more than one hundred enforcement
actions involving unfair data collection practices as well as broken privacy
and security promises.80  Through these actions, the FTC hopes to protect
consumers against information-related injuries, including deception injuries,
financial injuries, health and safety injuries, intrusion injuries, and reputa-
tional injuries.81
In FTC v. Wyndham, for example, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts agreed
to settle FTC charges that the company’s faulty data security practices
unfairly exposed the payment-card information of hundreds of thousands of
77 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09, 6821–27 (2012) (requiring financial institutions to
provide notice to customers of privacy policies and practices, regulating financial institu-
tions’ disclosure of nonpublic personal information, and requiring financial institutions to
develop an information security plan); Data Protection Act 2018, c.12 (UK) (regulating the
processing of personal data); Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. pt. 313
(2019) (federal regulations implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); Cameron Abbot,
Facebook Fined £500,000 Over Cambridge Analytica Scandal, NAT’L L. REV. (July 13, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/facebook-fined-500000-over-cambridge-analytica-
scandal (reporting that the UK Information Commissioner’s Office fined Facebook
£500,000 for violating UK’s Data Protection Act of 1998 following Facebook’s failure to
protect user data and Facebook’s lack of transparency regarding its handling of user data).
78 See, e.g., Privacy and Security Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (“The FTC has brought legal actions against organizations that
have violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled them by failing to maintain security for
sensitive consumer information.  In many of these cases, the FTC has charged the defend-
ants with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars unfair and deceptive acts and
practices in or affecting commerce.”).
79 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.”).
80 See generally Alexander E. Reicher & Yan Fang, FTC Privacy and Data Security Enforce-
ment and Guidance Under Section 5, J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL., Fall 2016,
at 89, 89 (providing outstanding guidance regarding the contours of the FTC’s privacy and
security enforcement under section 5 of the FTC Act, and stating that the FTC has brought
more than one hundred privacy and security cases using Section 5 of the FTC Act); Mau-
reen K. Ohlhausen, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at Federal Communications
Bar Association Luncheon: Painting the Privacy Landscape: Informational Injury in FTC
Privacy and Data Security Cases 1–2 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1255113/privacy_speech_mkohlhausen.pdf (noting that
the FTC has brought “more than 500 privacy and data security cases, both online and off”
under a number of different statutes, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act).
81 See Ohlhausen, supra note 80, at 1, 3–9 (summarizing and providing examples of
these five types of consumer information injuries).
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consumers to hackers in three separate data breaches, thus exposing Wynd-
ham guests to financial injuries.82  As part of its December 2015 settlement,
Wyndham agreed to establish a comprehensive information-security pro-
gram, conduct annual information-security audits, and prevent future hack-
ers from stealing consumer data, among other measures.83
Although the Wyndham case involved stolen, payment-card data, other
FTC cases have involved stolen health data.  In an August 2013 complaint
against Atlanta-based LabMD, for example, the FTC alleged that the clinical
laboratory testing company failed to reasonably protect the security of its
patients’ identifiable health data and that this failure constituted an unfair
practice affecting consumers in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.84  The
FTC specifically alleged that LabMD failed to protect the names, social secur-
ity numbers, dates of birth, health insurance policy numbers, and standard-
ized health procedure codes of 9300 patients.85
In its press release announcing the complaint against LabMD, the FTC
stated that it was “committed to ensuring that firms who collect . . . data
[take] reasonable and appropriate security measures to prevent it from fall-
ing into the hands of identity thieves and other unauthorized users.”86  In a
separate press release, the FTC explained: “[A] company’s data security mea-
sures must be reasonable and appropriate in light of the sensitivity and vol-
ume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity of its
business, and the cost of available tools to improve security and reduce vul-
nerabilities.”87  It is clear, then, that under federal consumer law, mobile
health apps must implement reasonable and appropriate security measures
82 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly
Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter FTC/
Wyndham Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wynd-
ham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment (announcing the settlement);
Wyndham Worldwide Issues Statement on FTC Settlement, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 9, 2015), https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wyndham-worldwide-issues-statement-on-ftc-settle
ment-300190509.html (same). See generally Jennifer K. Wagner, Assoc. Dir. of Bioethics
Research, Geisinger, FTC Regulation of Mobile Health Apps (Apr. 24, 2018) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation) (on file with author) (providing an outstanding overview of FTC
regulation of mobile health apps).
83 See FTC/Wyndham Press Release, supra note 82.
84 Complaint at 3, ¶ 10, In re LabMD, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3099, Docket No. 9357
(Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinafter LabMD Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2013/08/130829labmdpart3.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
FTC Files Complaint Against LabMD for Failing to Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Aug. 29,
2013) [hereinafter FTC/LabMD Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/08/ftc-files-complaint-against-labmd-failing-protect-consumers.
85 See LabMD Complaint, supra note 84, at 4–5; FTC/LabMD Press Release, supra note
84.
86 FTC/LabMD Press Release, supra note 84.
87 FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECUR-
ITY SETTLEMENT 1 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131
gmrstatement.pdf.
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and not make statements regarding such measures that are false, misleading,
or deceptive.88
Section 5 of the FTC Act is not the only legal authority to impose data
privacy and security obligations on data collectors in certain contexts.  The
current version of the Federal Common Rule, for example, contains a regula-
tion designed in part to protect research-participant privacy and research-
data confidentiality.89  As background, the Common Rule regulates nonex-
empt, human-subjects research that receives federal financial support from a
signatory federal agency90 and research conducted in contemplation of a
submission to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval.91
Although many research protocols are subject to the Common Rule due to
federal funding, an FDA submission, a state law that requires compliance
with the Common Rule, or a researcher employment contract or affiliation
agreement requiring compliance with the Common Rule, some mobile-app-
mediated research studies remain free of Common Rule regulation.92
For research that is subject to the Common Rule, the overarching goal
of the Common Rule is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of research
participants.  Protecting the privacy of research participants and the confi-
dentiality of their research data is one part of that larger goal.93  Indeed,
institutional review boards (IRBs) that review research to ensure compliance
with the Common Rule must find “adequate provisions to protect the privacy
88 Although neither Wyndham nor LabMD were collecting health data through a
mobile health app, the FTC has taken several enforcement actions against mobile apps in
the context of deceptive claims and broken promises. See Complaint for Permanent
Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 4, FTC v. Pact, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01429 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1523010
pactcomplaint.pdf (noting that the defendant mobile app “continued to charge (rather
than pay) many consumers who have completed their pacts and bill consumers who have
attempted to cancel the service, despite continued promises to the contrary”); Mobile Tech-
nology Issues, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
mobile-technology (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (linking to a number of press releases
announcing enforcement actions involving mobile apps).
89 See text accompanying infra note 94.
90 See, e.g., Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of
the General Compliance Date of Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three Burden-
Reducing Provisions During the Delay Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497 (June 19, 2018) (to be
codified in scattered titles of the Code of Federal Regulations) [hereinafter Final Common
Rule Amendments] (listing the agencies that have signed on to the Common Rule).
91 See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.101–.124 (2018) (codifying HHS’s Common Rule); Final
Common Rule Amendments, supra note 90, at 28,518 (showing changes to HHS’s Com-
mon Rule with which compliance is required by Jan. 21, 2019); Mark A. Rothstein, Research
Privacy Under HIPAA and the Common Rule, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 154, 155 (2005) (explain-
ing the application of the Common Rule).
92 See Michelle N. Meyer, Assistant Professor, The Common Rule and Research with
Mobile Devices (Apr. 24, 2018) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation), https://louis
ville.edu/mobileelsi/wgm-2-thought-leader-input-and-regulatory-framework/presentation-
by-michelle-meyer/ (explaining in detail when research is regulated by the Common
Rule).
93 See Rothstein, supra note 91, at 155.
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of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data,” when appropriate, in
order for the research to proceed.94  Although IRBs have the primary
responsibility for ensuring researcher compliance with the Common Rule,95
the Federal Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) within HHS
maintains regulatory oversight as well.96
In addition to federal authorities such as section 5 of the FTC Act and
the Common Rule, several state constitutions contain a right to privacy that
has been interpreted to protect individually identifiable health informa-
tion.97  Florida’s constitution, for example, provides that “[e]very natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”98  Long
understood to protect an individual’s right to privacy vis-a`-vis governmental
intrusions, scholars have pushed to extend Florida’s constitutional right to
privacy to nongovernmental intrusions as well, although these efforts have, to
date, been unsuccessful.99  Other state constitutions, including those of
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Caro-
lina, and Washington, also establish rights to privacy applicable to health
information.100
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Federal Common Rule, and the state con-
stitutions listed above are illustrative, but not exhaustive, examples of legal
authorities that have been interpreted to require certain health data holders
in certain contexts to maintain data privacy and security.101  Note, however,
that not one of these legal authorities sets forth particular privacy and secur-
ity standards.  Indeed, section 5 of the FTC Act does not mention the words
94 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (2018).
95 Rothstein, supra note 91, at 155.
96 See Office for Human Research Protections, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https:/
/www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (“[OHRP] provides leadership in the
protection of the rights, welfare, and wellbeing of human subjects involved in research
conducted or supported by the [HHS]. . . . OHRP provides clarification and guidance,
develops educational programs and materials, maintains regulatory oversight, and provides
advice on ethical and regulatory issues in biomedical and behavioral research.”).
97 See, e.g., Catherine Louisa Glenn, Note, Protecting Health Information Privacy: The Case
for Self-Regulation of Electronically Held Medical Records, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1605, 1609 n.25
(2000) (referencing the state constitutions of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington as establishing rights to pri-
vacy applicable to health information).
98 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
99 See Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in the Age
of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection from Private and Commercial
Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 53–55 (1997) (recommending that Florida’s constitu-
tion be amended to protect against nongovernmental intrusions as well as governmental
intrusions).
100 See Glenn, supra note 97, at 1609 n.25.
101 See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Florida Law, Mobile Research Applications, and the Right to
Privacy, 43 NOVA L. REV. 353 (2019) (identifying additional sources of protection under
Florida law).
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privacy and security at all102 and the Common Rule contains only one IRB
review criterion (among seven) referencing privacy and confidentiality.103
Even California’s constitution, recognized as one of the broadest in the coun-
try, only provides: “All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.”104
Other domestic and international laws do, however, set forth specific
privacy, security, and breach notification standards that may be used to guide
the conduct of mobile-app-mediated health research by independent
researchers, citizen scientists, and patient researchers as well as other health
data collectors and processors.  In the United States, the HIPAA Rules estab-
lish detailed privacy, security, and breach notification standards105 for cov-
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.”).  The FTC has published a variety of privacy and security suggestions,
recommendations, guidelines, and best practices (collectively, best practices); however,
these best practices are not codified or promulgated in statutes or regulations. See, e.g.,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, MARKETING YOUR MOBILE APP: GET IT RIGHT FROM THE START 1, 2–5
(2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0140_market-
ing-your-mobile-app.pdf (providing general guidelines for consideration by mobile-app
developers, including guidelines such as “[b]uild privacy considerations in from the start,”
“[b]e transparent about your data practices,” “[h]onor your privacy promises,” “[p]rotect
kids’ privacy,” “[c]ollect sensitive information only with consent,” and “[k]eep user data
secure”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY, at i, 1–29 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-com-
mission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (offering several suggestions for
“major participants in the mobile ecosystem” as they “work to improve mobile privacy dis-
closures”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 22–71 (2012) (setting forth best practices in the areas of privacy by design, simpli-
fied consumer choice, and transparency); Mobile Health App Developers: FTC Best Practices,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guid
ance/mobile-health-app-developers-ftc-best-practices (providing best privacy and security
practices for mobile health app developers); Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security (last visited Sept. 16,
2019) (providing summaries of major pieces of federal legislation relating to privacy and
security); Ohlhausen, supra note 80 (addressing consumer injury in the FTC’s privacy and
security cases and identifying and warning against five types of consumer informational
injuries).
103 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (2018) (setting forth seven IRB review criteria; the sev-
enth criterion provides: “When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the
privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.”).
104 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1974).
105 See, e.g., John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds Without Getting Drenched: A Call for Fair
Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 193, 217 (2011) (referencing
HIPAA as an industry-specific standard); Grace Fleming, Note, HIPAA-Cratic or HIPAA-Criti-
cal: U.S. Privacy Protections Should Be Guaranteed by Covered Entities Working Abroad, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2375, 2379 (2014) (noting that HIPAA was enacted, in part, in response to the
need for an industry standard in the context of electronic health records).
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ered entities and business associates that use or disclose a subset of
individually identifiable health information known as protected health infor-
mation (PHI).106  In the European Union, the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) is quickly becoming known as the global standard in all
industries (not just the healthcare industry) for individuals and institutions
that control and process all types of personal data, including health data.107
The remainder of this Part reviews the application of the HIPAA Rules and
the GDPR as well as the specific privacy, security, and breach notification
standards set forth therein.  The purpose of this review is to highlight core
privacy, security, and breach notification principles that could serve as a
guide for mobile-app-mediated research conducted by independent scientists
and other big data processors while also noting the limitations of these
regulations.
A. Application of the HIPAA Rules and the GDPR
The HIPAA Rules, including the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach
Notification Rules,108 regulate covered entities109 and business associates.110
Again, covered entities include health plans,111 healthcare clearing-
houses,112 and those healthcare providers that transmit health information
in electronic form in connection with certain standard transactions including
the health claim transaction.113  A business associate is a person or organiza-
tion that provides certain services to a covered entity, other than in the capac-
ity of a workforce member of the covered entity, who needs access to PHI to
perform the service.114  With four, rarely implicated exceptions, PHI is indi-
106 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining protected health information).
107 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, Tech Giants Brace for Europe’s New Data Privacy Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/technology/europe-data-
privacy-rules.html (reporting that Europe has set the “regulatory standard” in terms of data
privacy with the GDPR); id. (quoting Julie Brill, corporate vice president and deputy gen-
eral counsel at Microsoft, as stating that Microsoft “embrace[s] [the] G.D.P.R. because it
sets a strong standard for privacy and data protection rights”); Mark Scott & Laurens Ceru-
lus, Europe’s New Data Protection Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy-standards-gdpr-gen
eral-protection-data-regulation/ (“Since the mid-1990s, EU policymakers have rolled out a
series of data protection rules that quickly became the de facto global standards for most
countries except for a few holdouts.”); id. (quoting Vera Jourova´, the European commis-
sioner for justice, as stating that the European Union “want[s] to set the global standard”
with the GDPR).
108 See sources cited supra note 10.
109 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining covered entity); id. § 160.102(a) (applying the
HIPAA Rules to covered entities).
110 Id. § 160.103 (defining business associate); id. § 160.102(b) (applying the HIPAA
Rules to business associates).
111 Id. § 160.103 (defining health plan).
112 Id. (defining healthcare clearinghouse).
113 Id. (defining covered entity).
114 Id. (defining business associate).
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vidually identifiable health information.115  Health information that has
been properly deidentified, however, is not regulated by the HIPAA Rules.116
One permissible method of deidentifying information involves the removal
of eighteen different identifiers from the data including, but not limited to,
names, all geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, all elements of dates
except for year for individuals eighty-nine years of age and younger, full-face
photographic images and comparable images, and any other unique identify-
ing number, characteristic, or code.117
Neither ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, nor MyFitnessPal is owned or oper-
ated by a covered healthcare provider, health plan, healthcare clearinghouse,
or business associate thereof.  Neither ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, nor MyFit-
nessPal performs covered provider, plan, clearinghouse, or business associate
functions.  Therefore, the HIPAA Rules generally will not regulate these
mobile apps.118  That is, the United States’ primary privacy, security, and
115 Id. (defining “individually identifiable health information” as a subset of health
information that is “created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer,
or health care clearinghouse” and that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual;
or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual”);
id. (listing the four exclusions from the definition of PHI).
116 Id. § 164.514(a) (“Health information that does not identify an individual and with
respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to
identify an individual is not individually identifiable health information.”); id.
§ 164.514(b)(1)–(2) (setting forth two methods for health information to be considered
deidentified).
117 Id. § 164.514(b)(2) (listing the eighteen identifiers that must be removed from pro-
tected health information for the information to be considered deidentified).
118 To the extent the companies that own and operate these mobile apps offer health
insurance to their employees through a group health plan, the HIPAA Rules will regulate
the group health plan if such plan has fifty or more participants or is administered by a
third-party administrator (TPA). See id. § 160.103 (defining covered entity to include
health plans); id. (defining health plan to include group health plan); id. (defining group
health plan to include an employee welfare benefit plan with fifty or more participants as
well as those administered by a TPA).  Tidyware, which operates ActiveDay, appears to be a
small company that may or may not offer health insurance to its employees; if it does offer
health insurance to its employees through a group health plan, there may not be fifty or
more participants in that health plan. See Tidyware LLC, MANTA, https://www.manta.com/
c/mb42sxd/tidyware-llc (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (“Tidyware LLC is a privately held com-
pany in Bellevue, WA[,] . . . [that] was established in 2012 and incorporated in Washing-
ton.  Current estimates show this company has an annual revenue of [$]204,157 and
employs a staff of approximately 3.”).  On the other hand, Under Armour is a large com-
pany that offers three different types of health plans to thousands of employees. See Bene-
fits at Under Armour, UNDER ARMOUR, https://tbcdn.talentbrew.com/company/7686/v1_0/
doc/UA_RecruitBenefitsOverview_121918_4.pdf (last visited June 25, 2018) (describing
the health insurance benefits available to full-time Under Armour employees).  Under
Armour thus has a group health plan that is regulated by the HIPAA Rules.  To the extent
Under Armour has taken advantage of HIPAA’s hybrid-entity rules, designating its group
health plan as a covered healthcare component and MyFitnessPal as a nonhealthcare com-
ponent, the HIPAA Rules do not apply to MyFitnessPal. See infra note 121 (discussing
HIPAA’s hybrid-entity rules).
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breach notification standards applicable to the healthcare industry simply do
not apply, even though ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, and MyFitnessPal collect,
use, and disclose a fair amount of health data.  In this sense, the HIPAA
Rules have not kept pace with the individuals and institutions that are collect-
ing, using, and disclosing health data.
Kinsey Reporter is a joint project of the Kinsey Institute for Research in
Sex, Gender, and Reproduction (KI) and the Center for Complex Networks
and Systems Research (CNetS), both at Indiana University (IU), Blooming-
ton.119  IU does perform some HIPAA-covered functions through its student
health center, its medical and other health professional schools, and its
employee group health plan.120  However, IU has taken advantage of
HIPAA’s hybrid-entity rules to exclude KI and CNetS from its designated
healthcare components.121  The result is that the HIPAA Rules do not apply
to the projects of KI and CNetS, including Kinsey Reporter.  Stated another
way, the data Kinsey Reporter collects related to sexual health and other inti-
mate behavior is not protected by the HIPAA Rules.
Assuming for the moment that the HIPAA Rules did apply to Kinsey
Reporter, ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, and MyFitnessPal, all four apps collect
health information that is not deidentified in accordance with the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.  For example, Kinsey Reporter collects sexual and reproductive
health information (e.g., missed menses associated with the ingestion of hor-
monal birth control) combined with the city, state, and country (e.g., “Semi-
nole, FL, US”) of the reporting citizen sex scientist.122  Because the HIPAA
Privacy Rule requires cities and other geographic designations smaller than a
state to be removed in order for health information to be deidentified, the
data collected by Kinsey Reporter would not be considered deidentified.123
Similarly, ActiveDay and FallSafety Pro collect data regarding current
physical status and provision of care by a first responder combined with the
precise geolocation of the citizen scientist who fell, exercised, or otherwise
119 See Kinsey Reporter Privacy Policy, supra note 40.
120 See IND. UNIV., HIPAA-A03, DESIGNATION OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY AS A HYBRID ENTITY,
at  attachment A (2014) (listing the Indiana University Health Center; the Indiana Univer-
sity Counseling and Psychological Services; the Indiana University Schools of Arts & Sci-
ence, Medicine, Dentistry, and Optometry; and the Indiana University health plans as
HIPAA-covered health care components).
121 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.103 (defining, for purposes of the HIPAA Rules, a hybrid entity
as a single legal entity whose business activities include both covered and noncovered func-
tions); id. § 164.105(c)(1) (requiring a covered entity that wishes to take advantage of
HIPAA’s hybrid-entity rules to designate itself as a hybrid entity and to document that
designation); id. § 164.105(a)(1) (stating that the HIPAA Rules only apply to the desig-
nated health care components of a hybrid entity); IND. UNIV., supra note 120 (designating
IU as a hybrid entity); id. at attachment A (listing IU’s HIPAA-covered health care compo-
nents and not including KI within that list).
122 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (identifying the data elements gath-
ered by Kinsey Reporter from its citizen sex scientists).
123 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (“The following identifiers of the individual . . . [must
be] removed: . . . [a]ll geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes . . . .”).
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moved.124  Again, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires all geographic subdivi-
sions smaller than a state to be removed in order for health information to
be deidentified.  Thus, the data collected by ActiveDay and FallSafety Pro
would not meet the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s deidentification standard.
Likewise, PatientsLikeMe collects a significant amount of data regarding
individuals’ physical and mental health (e.g., colon cancer, genital herpes,
HIV, obesity, paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol-use disorder, and drug-use dis-
order) combined with a number of identifiers (e.g., names, user names, full
facial photographs, and ages).125  Like the data collected by Kinsey Reporter
and ActiveDay, the data collected by PatientsLikeMe would not meet the
HIPAA Privacy Rule’s deidentification standard if the HIPAA Rules applied.
Finally, MyFitnessPal collects a fair amount of physical health informa-
tion, including body weight and nutritional information, combined with
identifiers including names, usernames, physical addresses, email addresses,
dates of birth, and approximate or precise locations when exercising or
inputting data.126  The data collected by MyFitnessPal would not be consid-
ered deidentified either.  In large summary, the HIPAA Rules are too limited
in application.  That is, they do not protect the data collected by four illustra-
tive mobile research apps even though the data collected by the apps relate
to health and are clearly identifiable or could lead to the identification of the
data subject.
Although the HIPAA Rules were designed to regulate health industry
participants—including healthcare providers, healthcare clearinghouses,
health plans, and business associates thereof—the GDPR was designed to
protect personal data regardless of the industry or context in which the data
was generated or is maintained.  In particular, the GDPR regulates (1) per-
sonal data controllers and processors established in the European Union,
regardless of whether the data processing takes place inside or outside the
European Union; (2) the processing of personal data of data subjects who
are in the EU by a controller or processor not established in the EU if the
data processing relates to the offering of goods or services to data subjects in
the European Union or the monitoring of behavior in the European Union
by data subjects; and (3) the processing of personal data by a controller not
established in the European Union but in a place where a member state’s law
applies by virtue of public international law.127
124 FallSafety Privacy Policy, supra note 54 (“FallSafety may use third party services that
may collect user information.  These services include . . . geolocation services . . . .  These
services may collect information sent by your browser such as cookies or your IP request.”).
125 See text accompanying supra notes 63–65 (discussing the data collected by
PatientsLikeMe).
126 See text accompanying supra note 69–70 (discussing the data collected by
MyFitnessPal).
127 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU), art. 3(1)–(3)
[hereinafter GDPR]; EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 3/2018 ON THE TERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF THE GDPR (ARTICLE 3) (Nov. 16, 2018), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/
files/consultation/edpb_guidelines_3_2018_territorial_scope_en.pdf (explaining—and
illustrating with examples—the territorial scope of the GDPR).
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The GDPR defines a data controller as any “natural or legal person, pub-
lic authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, deter-
mines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”128  The
GDPR’s regulation of natural persons will become important in Part III,
where the author will show that some states currently regulate only govern-
ment agencies or similar institutions, but not natural persons.  The author
will argue that these statutes should be expanded to regulate natural persons
as well.
The GDPR also defines a data processor as any “natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on
behalf of the controller.”129  Processing means “any operation or set of oper-
ations which is performed on personal data . . . [including the] collection,
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, . . . combination,
restriction, erasure, or destruction [of data].”130  Personal data means “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”131  An
identifiable natural person is a person “who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an iden-
tification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more fac-
tors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity of that natural person.”132
All four mobile apps—Kinsey Reporter (through IU’s Kinsey Institute
and CNetS), ActiveDay (through Tidyware), PatientsLikeMe, and MyFitness-
Pal (through Under Armour)—would meet the GDPR’s definition of a data
controller.  That is, all four companies and/or apps involve natural or legal
persons who are collecting, using, and disclosing personal data relating to
physical or physiological health.  In the cases of PatientsLikeMe and MyFit-
nessPal, the personal data collected is clearly identifiable due to the apps’
collection of names, online identifiers, and other identifiers.  In the cases of
Kinsey Reporter and ActiveDay, it is not clear whether the personal data is
identifiable.  Kinsey Reporter only collects the general (city) location of the
reporting citizen sex scientist.  ActiveDay does, however, collect the precise
geolocation of the reporting citizen scientist.
Because PatientsLikeMe and MyFitnessPal monitor the behavior of data
subjects in the European Union, the data collected by these two apps are
clearly protected by the GDPR.133  To the extent the data collected by Kinsey
Reporter meets the GDPR’s identifiability standard, the data collected by Kin-
128 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 4(7).
129 Id. art. 4(8).
130 Id. art. 4(2).
131 Id. art. 4(1).
132 Id.
133 See PatientsLikeMe Privacy Policy, supra note 65; Under Armour Privacy Policy, supra note
69.
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sey Reporter also may be regulated by the GDPR.134  To the extent the data
collected by ActiveDay meets the GDPR’s identifiability standard and to the
extent that ActiveDay monitors the behavior of data subjects in the European
Union (which the author was unable to discover), then ActiveDay also may
be regulated by the GDPR.  In summary, an EU cross-industry regulation, but
not the HIPAA Rules, protects the health data collected by at least two of the
illustrative, U.S.-based, mobile research apps discussed in this Article.
Assuming for the moment that the HIPAA Rules do protect the data
collected by Kinsey Reporter, ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, and MyFitnessPal,
either through an amendment to the definition of covered entity or through
a new statute or regulation containing similar substantive requirements, are
there particular provisions within the HIPAA Rules (or the GDPR) that are
important to apply to mobile-app-mediated health research?  A brief review
of the substance of each of the HIPAA Rules and the GDPR is necessary
before proceeding.
B. Privacy
1. The Use and Disclosure Requirements
The HIPAA Privacy Rule contains three groups of subregulations,
including the “use and disclosure” requirements,135 the individual rights,136
and the administrative requirements.137  In terms of its use and disclosure
requirements, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities and business
associates to adhere to one of three different requirements depending on the
purpose of the information use or disclosure.138  The first use and disclosure
requirement allows covered entities and business associates to use and dis-
close PHI with no prior permission from the individual who is the subject of
the PHI—but only in certain situations.  That is, covered entities may freely
use and disclose PHI without any form of prior permission in order to carry
out certain treatment, payment, and healthcare operations139 activities (col-
lectively, TPO activities),140 as well as certain public-benefit activities.141
134 See Explore: Top Surveys in IT, KINSEY REPORTER, https://kinseyreporter.org/#/ex
plore?country=1 (showing that several citizen sex scientists located in Italy have used Kin-
sey Reporter to report female hormonal birth control use and effects).
135 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502–.514 (2018).
136 Id. §§ 164.520–.528.
137 Id. § 164.530.
138 Id. §§ 164.502–.514 (setting forth the use and disclosure requirements applicable to
covered entities and business associates).  In a number of prior articles, this author care-
fully reviewed the history, application, and general framework of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
See, e.g., Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, supra note 22, at 1367–74 (detailing the history of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule with a focus on civil enforcement).  With updates and technical
changes, the brief summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule set forth in Section II.B of this
Article is taken with the permission of the author from these prior publications.
139 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining treatment, payment, and health care operations).
140 See id. § 164.506(c)(1) (permitting a covered entity to use or disclose PHI for its
own treatment, payment, or health care operations); id. § 164.506(c)(2)–(4) (permitting a
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Assuming that the HIPAA Rules were extended to the four mobile
research apps discussed in this Article, the treatment and payment provisions
in the first use and disclosure requirement would have little application or
relevance.  In general, independent scientists who own, operate, or use
mobile research apps are not themselves providing healthcare, submitting
claims to insurers for such healthcare, paying claims submitted by participat-
ing providers, engaging in most healthcare operations activities, or participat-
ing in public-benefit activities.  In summary, and to the extent the HIPAA
Privacy Rule was used as a guide for the future regulation of mobile-app-
mediated research conducted by independent scientists, it would not be as
important to have a TPO provision or a complete public-benefits provision
allowing the unauthorized use and disclosure of research participants’ health
data.  Stated another way, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s concentrated focus on
treatment, payment, operations, and other traditional activities engaged in
by healthcare providers and health plans is outdated given the growth in
non-covered-entity collection, use, and disclosure of health data.
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s second use and disclosure require-
ment, a covered entity or business associate may use and disclose an individ-
ual’s PHI for certain activities, but only if the individual is informed (orally or
in writing) in advance of the use or disclosure and is given the (oral or writ-
ten) opportunity to agree to, prohibit, or restrict the use or disclosure.142
The certain activities captured by this provision include, but are not limited
to, disclosures of PHI (1) from a healthcare provider’s facility directory; (2)
to a person who is involved in an individual’s care or payment for care; and
(3) for certain notification purposes, such as when an attending physician or
a hospital social worker notifies a partner or spouse of a patient’s death.143
Like the first use and disclosure requirement, this second use and disclo-
sure requirement also has low application in the instant context.  Indepen-
dent scientists tend not to affiliate with hospitals and other healthcare
facilities that have patient directories.  As nonhealthcare providers, they also
do not provide patient care or accept payment for care, and thus do not have
a need to disclose PHI to persons involved in patient care or payment for
care.  Therefore, and to the extent the HIPAA Privacy Rule was used as some
type of reference guide for the future regulation of independent, mobile-
app-based research, it would not be important to have an oral agreement
provision.  It would not be practical either, given the remote nature of
mobile-app-mediated research.
covered entity to disclose PHI to certain recipients for the recipients’ treatment, payment,
or health care operations activities, respectively).
141 Covered entities may use and disclose PHI for twelve different public-policy activi-
ties without the prior written authorization of the individual who is the subject of the infor-
mation. See id. § 164.512(a)–(l).
142 See id. § 164.510 (titled “Uses and disclosures requiring an opportunity for the indi-
vidual to agree or object”).
143 See id. § 164.510(a), (b)(1)(i)–(ii).
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s third use and disclosure requirement—a
default rule—requires covered entities and business associates to obtain the
prior written authorization of the individual who is the subject of the PHI
before using or disclosing the individual’s PHI in any situation that does not
fit within the first two rules.144  If the HIPAA Privacy Rule was used as some
type of roadmap for the future regulation of independent, mobile-app-based
research, this rule would be relevant.  That is, mobile health research apps
collect, use, and/or disclose PHI for a purpose—research—that typically
does not fit within the first two rules.145  Although much has been made of
the concern that some individuals do not read or understand authorizations
and other types of mandated forms and disclosures,146 this concern does not
obviate the ethical obligation of a researcher, regardless of whether the
researcher is affiliated or independent, to request permission to use an indi-
vidual’s data for research and to respect the individual’s decision.147  For
these reasons, this Article strongly recommends that future regulation of
independent, mobile-app-based research be guided by a principle that is
analogous to the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s third use and disclosure requirement.
That is, this Article strongly recommends that independent scientists obtain
some form of prior written permission of prospective research participants to
use and disclose their data for current and future research purposes.148
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires authorizations for research to contain
a number of core elements and required statements.149  Most of these ele-
ments and statements are relevant to the context of independent, mobile-
app-based research and should be included in authorization forms signed by
prospective research participants.  Specifically, this Article argues that each
prospective mobile research participant should be told (1) the name or other
144 See id. § 164.508(a)(1).
145 But see id. § 164.512(i) (listing four research exceptions to the prior authorization
requirement).  Unless mobile-app-mediated research falls into one of these four excep-
tions, the third use and disclosure requirement applies, and the prior written authorization
of the individuals who participate in the research is necessary.
146 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW 3–54, 55–118 (2014) (arguing that mandated disclosures routinely fail to achieve
their desired goals).
147 See Mark A. Rothstein, Improve Privacy in Research by Eliminating Informed Consent?
IOM Report Misses the Mark, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 507 (2009) (arguing that a recommenda-
tion of the Institute of Medicine that would automatically convert all patients into research
subjects without their knowledge or consent denigrates respect for autonomy).
148 But see Cohen & Mello, Big Data, supra note 5, at E2 (“Patients could be presented
with a blanket ‘front door’ authorization form and choose to sign or withhold permission.
However, this approach may prove to be mere ethical window dressing.  HIPAA appropri-
ately calls such a process authorization, not consent, because patients are rarely given the
information and opportunity to ask questions needed to give meaningful informed con-
sent to future uses of their data.  Even if those problems could be overcome, it is asking a
great deal of patients to imagine and assess how their information may be used and what
the risk of reidentification may be.” (footnotes omitted)).
149 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)–(2) (listing the core elements and required statements of
a HIPAA-compliant authorization form).
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specific identification of each mobile-app-mediated researcher who will be
collecting, using, and/or disclosing the individual’s data for research pur-
poses; (2) the name or specific identification of each person who will be
receiving the individual’s data from the researcher, including backend data
collectors, data processors, and/or other researchers; (3) a specific descrip-
tion of the individual’s data that will be collected by the mobile app and used
and/or disclosed by the researcher who identifies the information in a mean-
ingful fashion; (4) a specific description of the current research project for
which the individual’s data will be collected, used, and/or disclosed; (5) if
the researcher expects to use and/or disclose the individual’s data for future
research projects, information sufficient to put the individual on notice of
that expectation; (6) a specific expiration date (e.g., December 31, 2020) or
a relevant expiration event (e.g., “end of the research study”) after which the
individual’s data will no longer be collected, used, and/or disclosed; (7) the
electronic signature of the individual or the legal representative of the indi-
vidual who is agreeing to the data collection, use, and/or disclosure; (8) the
date that the individual or legal representative signed the authorization form;
and (9) a description of the right of the individual or legal representative
thereof to revoke the authorization together with the exceptions to the right
to revoke, including when the individual’s data has already been collected,
used, and/or disclosed.150  Conventional researchers who use mobile apps to
conduct federally regulated health research have already considered how
best to deliver mandated disclosures to remote research participants.151
These online processes could be adapted by independent researchers as well.
The above discussion showed how the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s use and dis-
closure requirements may be used as a reference point for considering
options for the future regulation of independent, mobile-app-based research.
Somewhat like the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which allows non-TPO and non-oral-
agreement uses and disclosures to be made only with prior written authoriza-
tion, the GDPR establishes consent as one among a number of alternatives
that must take place before the processing of personal data is lawful.152
According to the GDPR, consent “should be given by a clear affirmative act
establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of
the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to
him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or
an oral statement.”153  The GDPR further clarifies that consent can include
150 See id.(requiring these elements and statements). See generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON HIPAA AND INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZATION OF USES AND DISCLO-
SURES OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION FOR RESEARCH (2018) (responding to the 21st
Century Cures Act’s requirement that the HHS Secretary publish guidance regarding
future research authorizations).
151 See generally Moore et al., supra note 3, at figs. 2–3 (showing how Duke University
uses a mobile research app to deliver mandated disclosures to remotely located research
participants and to obtain their electronic signatures).
152 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 6.
153 Id. pmbl., para. 32.
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the “ticking [of] a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical
settings for information society services or another statement or conduct
which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the
proposed processing of his or her personal data.”154  The GDPR warns, how-
ever, that “[s]ilence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore con-
stitute consent.”155  With respect to the content of the consent, the GDPR
would require the data subject to be aware of, at least, “the identity of the
controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are
intended.”156  These two consent content elements mirror two of the core
authorization elements required by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.157
The above paragraph sets forth the GDPR’s requirements relating to
consent when the processing involves personal data.  If the data processed
meets the definition of personal “data concerning health,” then the data sub-
ject must give “explicit” consent unless an exception applies.158  The GDPR
defines personal data concerning health as “all data pertaining to the health
status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the past, current
or future physical or mental health status of the data subject.”159  According
to the GDPR, this includes “any information on, for example, a disease, disa-
bility, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment or the physiological or
biomedical state of the data subject independent of its source.”160  Excep-
tions to explicit consent exist for processing necessary for “preventive or
occupational medicine,” “reasons of public interest in the area of public
health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or
ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal
products or medical devices,” or “scientific or historical research purposes” to
the extent such purposes are “proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the
essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific
measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data
subject.”161
Because Kinsey Reporter, ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, and MyFitnessPal
collect personal data regarding physiological and/or biomedical states,162
then the explicit-consent requirement in the GDPR would seem to apply
unless a relevant exception to the explicit-consent requirement also applied.
These apps could attempt to rely on the exception for scientific research
purposes.163  In this case, however, the GDPR would still require the apps to
“respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. pmbl., para. 42.
157 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(ii), (iv) (2018).
158 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 9(1)–(2)(a).
159 Id. pmbl., para. 35.
160 Id.
161 Id. art. 9(2)(h)–(j).
162 See text accompanying supra notes 63–64, 70.
163 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 9(2)(j).
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and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of
the data subject”164 and obtain general consent.
In summary, both the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the GDPR require per-
mission (called authorization and consent, respectively) before PHI and per-
sonal data concerning health can be used, disclosed, or processed by a
regulated entity.  Likewise, this Article strongly recommends that indepen-
dent scientists obtain the prior, explicit permission of their mobile research
participants before their information is used, disclosed, or processed for
research or commercial purposes.  This Article recommends that the content
of this permission be guided by the required content of HIPAA-compliant
authorization forms.
2. Individual Rights
In addition to its use and disclosure requirements, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule also contains a second set of regulations establishing certain rights for
individuals who are the subject of PHI vis-a`-vis their covered entities, includ-
ing the rights to receive a notice of privacy practices,165 request additional
privacy protections,166 access their PHI,167 request amendments of incorrect
or incomplete PHI,168 and receive accountings of PHI disclosures.169  The
GDPR establishes somewhat similar rights for personal data subjects vis-a`-vis
their data controllers, including the rights to confirm personal data process-
ing,170 rectify inaccurate personal data,171 erase personal data,172 restrict
processing,173 and object to processing,174 among others.
All of these rights are potentially important in the context of mobile-
app-mediated health research.  This Article argues that certain of these
rights, including the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s right to receive a notice of privacy
practices and the GDPR’s right to confirm personal data processing, rectify
inaccurate personal data, and object to processing, are particularly impor-
tant.  For example, potential research participants should be informed
through a notice of privacy practices regarding how their mobile apps will
collect, use, and disclose their information for research; the rights that the
research participants have with respect to those collection, use, and disclo-
sure practices; and a means for research participants to complain if their
rights are violated.  By further example, research participants who enter
incorrect research data into their mobile apps, or whose smart phones are
164 Id.
165 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018).
166 Id. § 164.522.
167 Id. § 164.524.
168 Id. § 164.526.
169 Id. § 164.528.
170 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 15.
171 Id. art. 16.
172 Id. art. 17.
173 Id. art. 18.
174 Id. art. 21.
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used by family members or friends when data is being collected, should have
the opportunity to rectify the incorrect data entered or collected.  In addi-
tion, research participants who no longer wish to participate in research
should have the opportunity to object to the future collection of research
data through their mobile apps.
3. Administrative Requirements
In addition to the use and disclosure requirements and the individual
rights, both the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the GDPR contain a third set of
requirements known as the administrative requirements.  In particular, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities to designate a privacy officer
who will oversee compliance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, train workforce
members regarding how to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, sanction
workforce members who violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule, establish a com-
plaint process for individuals who believe their privacy rights have been vio-
lated, and develop privacy-related policies and procedures, among other
similar requirements.175  Likewise, the GDPR requires data controllers and
processors to designate a data protection officer who has expert knowledge
of data protection laws and practices,176 train staff involved in data process-
ing,177 allow data subjects to lodge complaints with supervisory authori-
ties,178 and develop policies and procedures designed to meet the principles
of privacy by design and protection by default,179 among other similar
requirements.
All of these administrative requirements are important in the context of
independent, mobile-app-mediated research, and this Article strongly recom-
mends their application.  A privacy official (or data protection officer) is
needed to establish privacy as a key component of mobile-app-mediated
research protocols and to ensure compliance with industry standards and
best practices.  Privacy policies and procedures should be implemented and
guide the mobile collection, use, and disclosure of research data.  Research
participants whose data is misused should have the right to complain, and
independent researchers should have the obligation to respond to and
resolve those complaints.
C. Security
So far, this Article has focused on research-participant privacy and
research-data confidentiality in the context of mobile-app-mediated research.
Data security is also important.  The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered
entities and business associates to implement administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
175 45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2018).
176 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 37(1), (5).
177 Id. art. 39.
178 Id. art. 77.
179 Id. pmbl., para. 78.
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availability of electronic, protected health information (ePHI).180  The
GDPR also requires data controllers and processors to secure networks and
information with a focus on resisting “accidental events or unlawful or mali-
cious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and con-
fidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data.”181
In particular, the HIPAA Security Rule’s administrative requirements
obligate covered entities and business associates to designate a security offi-
cial responsible for the development and implementation of the covered
entity’s or business associate’s security policies and procedures.182  These
policies and procedures shall (1) prevent, detect, contain, and correct secur-
ity violations; (2) ensure that workforce members have appropriate access to
ePHI; (3) prevent workforce members who should not have access to ePHI
from obtaining such access; (4) create a security awareness and training pro-
gram for all workforce members; and (5) address and respond to security
incidents, emergencies, environmental problems, and other occurrences
such as fires, vandalism, system failures, and natural disasters that affect sys-
tems containing ePHI and the security of ePHI, among other require-
ments.183  Somewhat similarly, the GDPR requires data controllers and
processors to (1) adopt internal policies and implement measures that meet
the principles of data protection by design and data protection by default;184
(2) evaluate the security risks inherent in the processing of personal data and
implement measures to mitigate those risks;185 (3) raise awareness regarding
security issues and train staff involved in data processing operations;186 and
(4) respond to physical and technical incidents that affect the ability of data
subjects to access their personal data,187 among other requirements.
In terms of physical safeguards, the HIPAA Security Rule requires cov-
ered entities and business associates to implement policies and procedures
that (1) limit physical access to electronic information systems and the facili-
ties in which they are located; (2) address the safeguarding, functioning, and
physical attributes of workstations through which ePHI is accessed; and (3)
govern the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media that con-
tain ePHI.188  Somewhat similarly, the GDPR requires policies and proce-
dures designed to prevent unauthorized access to electronic communications
180 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining ePHI); id. §§ 164.302–.310 (establishing the
security obligations of covered entities and business associates). See generally Sharona Hoff-
man & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331 (2007) (summarizing and critiquing the
HIPAA Security Rule).
181 GDPR, supra note 127, pmbl., para. 49.
182 45 C.F.R. § 164.308.
183 Id.
184 GDPR, supra note 127, pmbl., para. 78.
185 Id. pmbl., para. 83.
186 Id. art. 39(1)(b).
187 Id. art. 32(1)(c).
188 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2018).
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networks and damage to computer and electronic communications
systems.189
In terms of technical safeguards, the HIPAA Security Rule requires cov-
ered entities and business associates to implement (1) technical policies and
procedures for electronic information systems that maintain ePHI to allow
access only to those persons or software programs that have been granted
access rights; (2) hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that
record and examine activity in information systems that contain or use ePHI;
(3) policies and procedures to protect ePHI from improper alteration or
destruction; (4) procedures to verify that a person or entity seeking access to
ePHI is the one claimed; and (5) technical security measures to guard against
unauthorized access to ePHI that is being transmitted over an electronic
communications network.190  Similarly, the GDPR requires data controllers
and processors to implement appropriate technical measures to protect data
security including, but not limited to (1) the encryption of personal data;191
(2) the verification of data subjects who request online access to their per-
sonal data;192 and (3) the technical ability to restore the availability and
access to personal data in the event of a physical or technical incident,193
among other requirements.
Data security is extremely important in the context of health research,
including independent, mobile-app-mediated research.  A lack of security
can be devastating for the privacy of research participants and the confidenti-
ality of their sensitive research data.  For example, Feinstein Institutes for
Medical Research, a biomedical research institute based in Manhasset, New
York, recently agreed to pay HHS $3.9 million to settle potential violations of
the HIPAA Security Rule after the unsecured ePHI of approximately 13,000
research participants was stolen.194  The stolen ePHI included research par-
ticipants’ names, dates of birth, addresses, social security numbers, diagnoses,
laboratory results, medications, and medical information relating to their
research participation.195
A government investigation revealed that Feinstein had security mea-
sures that were insufficient to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availa-
189 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 49.
190 45 C.F.R. § 164.312.
191 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 32(1)(a).
192 Id. pmbl., para. 64.
193 Id. art. 32(1)(c).
194 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESOLUTION AGREEMENT WITH FEINSTEIN INSTI-
TUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH, at (I)–(II) (2016), [hereinafter FEINSTEIN RESOLUTION AGREE-
MENT], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fimr-resolution-agreement-and-corrective-
action-plan.pdf.
195 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Improper Disclosure of Research
Participants’ Protected Health Information Results in $3.9 Million HIPAA Settlement
(Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Feinstein Press Release], https://wayback.archive-it.org/
3926/20170127191441/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/17/improper-disclo
sure-research-participants-protected-health-information-results-in-hipaa-settlement.html.
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bility of Feinstein’s ePHI.196  Illustrative examples of Feinstein’s insufficient
security measures included (1) a lack of policies and procedures authorizing
access to ePHI by workforce members; (2) an absence of safeguards restrict-
ing access to ePHI by unauthorized users; (3) a lack of policies and proce-
dures governing the receipt and removal of laptops containing ePHI; and (4)
the failure to implement measures to encrypt ePHI or to document why
encryption was unnecessary in Feinstein’s research enterprise.197  In its press
release announcing the Feinstein settlement, HHS stated that “[f]or individ-
uals to trust in the research process and for patients to trust in [research]
institutions, they must have some assurance that their information is kept
private and secure.”198  Because a security breach similar to the Feinstein
breach could reoccur in the context of a mobile-app-mediated research pro-
ject, this Article strongly recommends the application to independent,
mobile-app-mediated researchers of security standards similar to those set
forth in the HIPAA Security Rule and the GDPR.
D. Breach Notification
In addition to privacy and security standards, both the HIPAA Rules and
the GDPR contain breach notification standards.  In particular, the HIPAA
Breach Notification Rule requires covered entities, following the discovery of
a breach199 of unsecured protected health information (uPHI),200 to notify
each individual whose uPHI has been, or is reasonably believed by the cov-
ered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed as a result of
such breach.201  The notification, which shall be provided without undue
delay and within sixty calendar days after the discovery of the breach, shall
include (1) a brief description of the nature of the breach, including the
date of the breach and the date of its discovery if known; (2) a description of
the types of uPHI involved in the breach; (3) any steps the individual should
take to protect herself from potential harm resulting from the breach; (4) a
brief description of the steps taken by the covered entity to investigate the
breach, to mitigate harm to individuals whose uPHI was part of the breach,
and to protect against future breaches; and (5) contact information sufficient
to allow individuals to ask questions or learn additional information about
the breach.202
When a breach involves the uPHI of more than 500 residents of a state
or jurisdiction, the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule also requires the covered
196 FEINSTEIN RESOLUTION AGREEMENT, supra note 194, at (I)(2)(ii); Feinstein Press
Release, supra note 195.
197 FEINSTEIN RESOLUTION AGREEMENT, supra note 194, at (I)(2)(i)–(vi); Feinstein Press
Release, supra note195.
198 Feinstein Press Release, supra note195 (quoting Office for Civil Rights Director
Jocelyn Samuels).
199 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (defining breach) (2018).
200 Id. (defining uPHI).
201 Id. § 164.404(a)(1).
202 Id. § 164.404(b)–(c).
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entity to notify prominent media outlets serving the state or jurisdiction.203
When a breach involves the uPHI of 500 or more individuals, regardless of
their states of residency, the covered entity is also required to notify the Sec-
retary of HHS within sixty calendar days after the discovery of the breach.204
Finally, when the breach involves the uPHI of less than 500 individuals, the
covered entity is required to notify the Secretary of HHS not later than 60
calendar days after the end of the calendar year.205
Somewhat similar to the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, the GDPR
requires data controllers to communicate without undue delay a personal
data breach206 to the subjects of the breach when the breach is “likely to
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”207  The
communication shall describe the nature of the data breach, the name and
contact details of the data protection officer or other contact person from
whom additional information can be gathered by the data subjects about the
data breach, the likely consequences of the data breach, and the measures
taken or that will be taken by the data controller to respond to the data
breach.208  In addition to notifying the data subjects, the controller shall also
notify the appropriate supervisory authority209 not later than seventy-two
hours after becoming aware of the breach, unless the breach is “unlikely to
result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”210
Breach notification is extremely important in the context of health
research, including independent, mobile-app-mediated research.  When
researchers fail to notify participants of a data breach, the participants may
lose the opportunity to protect themselves from economic, dignitary, and
psychological harms.  For example, Illinois-based Presence Health Network
recently paid HHS a $475,000 settlement amount following its failure to
make timely breach notifications.211  As background, HHS received a breach
notification report from Presence on January 31, 2014, stating that Presence
discovered on October 22, 2013, that paper-based operating-room schedules
containing the PHI of 836 individuals were missing from a surgery center
located in Joliet, Illinois.212  The PHI included the individuals’ names, dates
of birth, medical-record numbers, dates of procedures, types of procedures,
203 Id. § 164.406(a).
204 Id. § 164.408(b).
205 Id. § 164.408(c).
206 GDPR, supra note 127, art. 4(12) (defining personal data breach as a “breach of
security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed”).
207 Id. art. 34(1).
208 Id. art. 34(2).
209 Id. art. 51 (requiring each member state to provide for one or more independent
public authorities, called supervisory authorities, to be responsible for monitoring the
application of GDPR).
210 Id. art. 33(1).
211 See PRESENCE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 2–3.
212 Id. at 1–2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 36 26-NOV-19 8:43
190 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
surgeon names, and types of anesthesia.213  Although the HIPAA Breach
Notification Rule requires notification to be provided without undue delay
and within 60 calendar days after the discovery of the breach, Presence’s
breach notification process took substantially longer—approximately 101 cal-
endar days.214  A government investigation further revealed Presence’s fail-
ure to timely notify individuals in two additional breach cases, taking
approximately 104 days and 106 days from the date of discovery instead of
the mandatory 60 days.215  In its press release announcing the settlement,
HHS stated that “[i]ndividuals need prompt notice of a breach of their
unsecured PHI so they can take action that could help mitigate any potential
harm caused by the breach.”216
As discussed above, the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule applies to
neither Kinsey Reporter, ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, nor MyFitnessPal.217
The GDPR’s breach communication rule does apply to PatientsLikeMe and
MyFitnessPal but would not apply to non-EU-established researchers whose
mobile apps only monitor the behavior of data subjects outside the European
Union.  This Article strongly recommends that all mobile-app-based
researchers be required to timely notify their research participants of data
breaches to help protect against economic, dignitary, and psychological
harms.
III. STATE SURVEY RESULTS
As discussed in Part II, the HIPAA Rules will not apply to many indepen-
dent scientists who conduct or participate in mobile-app-mediated health
research.  Although the GDPR may apply to some apps that monitor behavior
that takes place in the European Union, some apps developed in the United
States that monitor behavior are used only by individuals located in the
United States.  Neither the HIPAA Rules nor the GDPR, therefore, can be
relied on to establish standards applicable to all health data gathered by
mobile research apps.  In addition, the HIPAA Rules are outdated in terms of
their concentrated focus on the treatment, payment, healthcare operations,
and other activities of traditional health industry participants.
This Part III responds to this limitation by assessing nonsectoral state
statutes that are potentially applicable to mobile-app-mediated research con-
ducted by independent scientists.  If applicable federal standards do not exist
or are outdated, and if the federal government fails to enact or enforce new
standards, perhaps state law can fill the gap in the meantime.  The state stat-
213 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., First HIPAA Enforcement Action
for Lack of Timely Breach Notification Settles for $475,000 (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter
Presence Press Release], http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170127111957/https://
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/01/09/first-hipaa-enforcement-action-lack-timely-breach-
notification-settles-475000.html.
214 PRESENCE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 2.
215 Id. at 2.
216 Presence Press Release, supra note 213.
217 See supra Section II.A.
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utes identified below are “potentially applicable” because they are not limited
in application to certain professionals, such as physicians or bankers; certain
institutions, such as hospitals, financial institutions, or government agencies;
certain sources of funding, such as federal funding; or certain industries,
such as the financial or health industries.  By definition, the independent
scientists who are the focus of this Article are not licensed healthcare profes-
sionals or bankers.  They are not employed by hospitals, government agen-
cies, or other institutions.  They do not receive federal funding, and they are
not tied to a particular business sector.
Because all fifty states and the District of Columbia (“states” or “state”)
have potentially applicable breach notification statutes218 but fewer states
have potentially applicable data security219 and data privacy220 statutes,
breach notification statutes will be discussed first.
218 See ALA. CODE § 8-38-1 to -12 (2019); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010–.090 (West
2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-551 to -552, 44-7601 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101
to -108 (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.1–.78 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6-1-713 to -716 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-701a to -701b, 42-471 (West
2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12B-100 to -104, 5001C (West 2019); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 28-3851 to -3853 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-1-910 to -912, -15-2 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 487N-1 to -3, 487R-2 (West
2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-51-104 to -107 (West 2019); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/
1–50 (West 2019); IND. CODE § 24-4.9-1-1 to .9-5-1 (West 2019); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 715C.1–.2 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-6,139b, -7a01–04 (West 2019); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 365.720–.734 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 to :3074 (2019); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1346–1350-B (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501
to -3508 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, §§ 1–6 (West 2019); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 445.63–.79d (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West 2019); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 75-24-29 (West 2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500 (West 2019); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-14-1701 to -1736 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-801 to -808 (West
2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 603A.010–.290 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-
C:19–21 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-161 to -163 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-
12c-1 to -12 (West 2019); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 899-aa, -bb (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 75-60 to -66 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN §§ 51-30-01 to -07 (West
2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.19, .191–.192, 1354.01 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, §§ 161–166 (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646A.600–.628 (West 2019),
amended by Act of May 24, 2019, 2019 Or. Laws ch. 180, S.B. 684; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. §§ 2301–2309 (West 2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN §§ 6-52-2, 11-49.3-1 to -6 (West
2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-40-19 to -26 (2019);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-150(g), 47-18-2101 to -2111 (West 2019); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 521.002, .053 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-101 to -301 (West
2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2430–2445 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West
2019); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.215.020, .255.010 (2019), amended by Act of May 7, 2019,
2019 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 241, S.H.B. 1071 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of
WASH. REV. CODE) (effective Mar. 1, 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN §§ 46A-2A-101 to -105 (West
2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 134.97–.98 (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to -509
(West 2019); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55, A.B.
375 (West) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198) (effective Jan. 1, 2020)),
amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B. 1121 (West); 201 MASS. CODE REGS.
17.01–.05 (2019).
219 See infra note 257 (listing the states that have nonsectoral data security statutes).
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A. State Breach Notification Laws
This Article finds that fifty-one (100%) of fifty-one states have enacted
data breach notification statutes that are potentially applicable to indepen-
dent scientists who conduct mobile-app-mediated health research.221  At the
outset, this Article notes that the fifty-one statutes originally had a wide vari-
ety of names, suggesting different purposes and scopes.  For example, thir-
teen (25.5%) of the fifty-one laws contain the phrase “identity theft” or
“identity crimes” in their formal or popular names, suggesting that protec-
tion against identity theft and associated economic harm is the primary, or an
important, purpose of the legislation.222  Twenty-three (45.1%) of the fifty-
one laws contain the phrase “breach,” “data breach,” “security breach,”
“breach of security,” “notice of breach,” “breach notice,” “notice of risk,” or
“notice of unauthorized acquisition” in their formal or popular names, sug-
gesting that notifying individuals that their data has been accessed without
authorization is the primary or an important purpose of the legislation.223
Thirteen (25.5%) of the fifty-one laws contain the phrase “personal data,”
“personal information,” “financial information,” “information protection,”
“information practices,” “consumer data privacy,” or “consumer records” in
their formal or popular names, suggesting that the protection of information
more generally is an important purpose of the legislation.224
Regarding content, all fifty-one (100%) of the breach notification stat-
utes contain individual breach notification provisions; that is, provisions
requiring notification of state residents, consumers, or other individuals
whose data was the subject of a security breach, depending on the circum-
220 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.83–.84 (West 2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170–24178 (West 2019);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 1201c–1206c (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026(4)(e) (West
2019); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.1(a) (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN.
§ 13-2002 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-302(15) (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 603A.300–.360 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14-4 (West 2019); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2440–2446 (McKinney 2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.607(12) (West. 2019);
18 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10) (West 2019); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 181.001–.207 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -102 (West 2019); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.16–.20 (West 2019); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55, A.B. 375 (West) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100–.198) (effective Jan. 1, 2020), amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B.
1121 (West).
221 See sources cited supra note 218.
222 The states with such laws are Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas. See sources cited supra note 218.
223 The states with such laws are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See sources cited supra note 218.
224 The states with such laws are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See sources cited
supra note 218.
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stances of the breach.225  Approximately two-thirds of the state laws require
notification of consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain files
on consumers on a nationwide basis, depending on the circumstances of the
breach.226  Approximately three-fifths of the state laws also require notifica-
tion of the states’ attorneys general, departments of legal affairs, offices of
consumer protection, and/or police, depending on the circumstances of the
breach.227  More than ninety percent of state laws require a third-party agent,
data storage company, data processor, data nonowner, or data nonlicensee to
notify the appropriate regulated entity, data controller, data owner, or data
licensee of the breach, depending on the circumstances of the breach.228
These breach notification provisions are very similar in purpose and
effect to those set forth in the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule and the
GDPR, as discussed in Section II.D.229  That is, these state provisions are
designed to alert both the individual who is the subject of the data as well as
an appropriate governmental agency of a data breach, thus enabling the indi-
vidual to take self-protection measures while also providing at least one gov-
ernment agency the opportunity to respond and/or monitor compliance.
Moving from content to application, these laws tend to have broad, but
not unlimited, application.  For example, Alabama’s Data Breach Notifica-
tion Act of 2018 applies to individuals and institutions that fall within the
Act’s definition of a “covered entity.”230  The Alabama law defines a covered
entity as a “person, sole proprietorship, partnership, government entity, cor-
poration, nonprofit, trust, estate, cooperative association, or other business
entity that acquires or uses sensitive personally identifying information.”231
The Alabama law defines “sensitive personally identifying information” as an
Alabama resident’s first name or first initial and last name together with
other sensitive information including, but not limited to, medical history,
mental condition, physical condition, medical treatment, or diagnosis.232
225 See sources cited supra note 218.
226 The states requiring notice to consumer reporting agencies are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia. See sources cited supra note 218.
227 The states requiring notice to a state agency are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See sources cited supra note
218.
228 All states except Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
and Utah require some third-party involvement. See sources cited supra note 218.
229 See supra Section II.D (discussing the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule and the
GDPR’s breach notification provisions).
230 See ALA. CODE § 8-38-2 (2019).
231 Id.
232 Id.
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An independent scientist is certainly a person and could also be a sole
proprietor, thus meeting the first part of the Alabama law’s definition of cov-
ered entity.  Depending on the mobile-app-mediated research project, how-
ever, the independent scientist may or may not be acquiring or using
sensitive personally identifying information as necessary for regulation to
occur.  In the hypothetical that opened this Article, recall the independent
scientist who developed a disease-progression mobile research app that col-
lected each research participant’s full name, date of birth, diagnosis, and
medications, among other data elements.233  If any of the disease-progres-
sion research participants who used the independent scientist’s app were Ala-
bama residents, the independent scientist would be acquiring and using
sensitive personally identifying information for purposes of the Alabama law.
Compare, however, Kinsey Reporter, which collects neither the name
(nor any type of user identity) nor precise geolocation of its citizen sex scien-
tists, but does collect data regarding the city, state, and country (e.g., “Semi-
nole, Florida, US”) where the reported sexual health issue or intimate
behavior occurred, as well as the age, gender, and IP address of the reporting
citizen sex scientist.234  Because the Alabama law only protects information
that is tied to the first name or first initial and last name of a data subject, the
Alabama law would not apply to Kinsey Reporter.  This is true even if a poten-
tially reidentifiable resident of a very small Alabama town shared the resi-
dent’s sexual health data with Kinsey Reporter and the security of that sexual
health data was subsequently breached.
As of this writing, more than two-thirds of other states’ breach notifica-
tion laws share this limitation.  That is, more than two-thirds of other states
only protect data that is tied to the first name or first initial and last name of
a data subject although other information, such as an individual’s mailing
address, geolocation, email address, telephone number, or photograph,
could be used to identify the data subject.235  These breach notification laws
fail to recognize that “[t]he aggregation and correlation of data from various
sources make it increasingly possible to link supposedly anonymous informa-
tion to specific individuals and to infer characteristics and information about
them.”236  Stated another way, these breach notification laws have not kept
233 See text accompanying supra note 3.
234 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
235 Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana (which also allows social security number to suffice),
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See sources cited supra note 218.
236 See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/ (“To
most people, ‘personal information’ means information like social security numbers,
account numbers, and other information that is unique to them.  U.S. privacy laws reflect
this conception by aiming at ‘personally identifiable information,’ but data scientists have
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up with big data’s ability to reidentify individuals with nonobvious
identifiers.237
Other states, however, have crafted slightly broader definitions of pro-
tected data.  Montana, for example, defines personal information as “an indi-
vidual’s name, signature, address, or telephone number, in combination
with” other information,238 thus recognizing that an individual’s signature,
address, or telephone number could also be used to identify an individual.
In counties with publicly accessible property records, for example, an individ-
ual’s address can quickly reveal the first and last name of the data subject if
the subject is the only person who owns and lives at the property.
Texas’s law, by further example, allows “an individual’s first name or first
initial and last name in combination with” certain other data to constitute
“[s]ensitive personal information.”239  Texas’s law also protects, however, any
other “information that identifies an individual and relates . . . to the physical
or mental health or condition of the individual.”240  Texas’s law is similar to
the HIPAA Rules,241 which recognize that first name or first initial and last
name are not the only ways individuals can be recognized.  This Article rec-
ommends that the law of Alabama (and the laws of the other states that are
similar to Alabama) be amended to include a laundry list of identifiers, simi-
lar to that set forth in the HIPAA Privacy Rule,242 but expanded given
advances in big data, so that all health data subjects, even those who do not
provide their first names or first initials and last names, are protected.
Other minor limitations in state laws prevent their application to all
independent scientists who conduct mobile-app-mediated health research.
Kansas’s data breach provisions, for example, only apply when the data
breach involves data that is linked to an unencrypted and unredacted social
repeatedly demonstrated that this focus can be too narrow.  The aggregation and correla-
tion of data from various sources make it increasingly possible to link supposedly anony-
mous information to specific individuals and to infer characteristics and information about
them.  The result is that today, a widening range of data has the potential to be personal
information, i.e. to identify us uniquely.  Few laws or regulations address this new reality.”).
237 Id.; see also Cohen & Mello, Big Data, supra note 5 (“When HIPAA was adopted in
1996, . . . Google did not exist, the global internet had about 100,000 websites, and geolo-
cation tracking was available only for the military. . . . Personal data were presumed noni-
dentifiable if stripped of 18 identifiers, most of which were direct identifiers . . . .  The
substantial increase in available personal information and advances in computing mean
that individuals can often be identified in deidentified data by triangulating data
sources.”).
238 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1702 (West 2019).
239 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2)(B)(i) (West 2019).
240 Id.
241 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining protected health information (PHI) based
on individually identifiable health information (IIHI), and defining IIHI to include infor-
mation relating to the “past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual”).
242 See id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)–(R) (listing eighteen identifiers that must be removed
from health information in order for the information to be considered deidentified under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
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security number, driver’s license number, state identification card number,
financial account number, or credit or debit card number.243  Kansas was
probably focused on the economic harms associated with identity theft when
it drafted its legislation.  Kansas’s legislation fails to recognize, however, the
dignitary and psychological harms associated with the unwanted disclosure of
sensitive and stigmatizing health information.
Alabama’s law picks up where Kansas’s law left off by including within its
definition of “sensitive personally identifying information” data linked to
medical history, physical condition, mental condition, medical treatment, or
diagnosis.244  Alabama’s inclusion of “physical condition” and “diagnosis”
would pull in, for example, the sexual health data collected by Kinsey
Reporter, the fall and first-responder data collected by ActiveDay and Fall-
Safety Pro, the terminal and other serious diagnoses of the PatientsLikeMe
registrants, and the weight, exercise, and nutrition data collected by MyFit-
nessPal.  Because some data—including data collected outside the context of
mobile research apps—does not relate to health but, instead, relates to prod-
ucts or services purchased, consumer tendencies, electronic network activity
information, internet browsing activity, and other nonpublic consumer pref-
erences, characteristics, psychological trends, preferences, predispositions,
behaviors, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes, states should con-
sider protecting these data elements as well.
Still other minor limitations in state laws become apparent when applied
to independent scientists who conduct mobile-app-mediated research.  Geor-
gia’s law, for example, applies to “data collector[s]” and “information bro-
ker[s].”245  “Data collector[s],” under Georgia law, are state and local
agencies.  “Information broker[s]” are “person[s] . . . who, for monetary fees
or dues, engage[ ] in . . . collecting, assembling, evaluating, . . . [or] transfer-
ring . . . information concerning individuals.”246  By definition, an indepen-
dent scientist does not work for a state or local agency.  In addition, many
independent scientists do not collect fees or dues from their research partici-
pants in exchange for engaging in research using the participants’ data.
Neither Kinsey Reporter, ActiveDay, PatientsLikeMe, nor MyFitnessPal
charges fees or dues for research participants, although some of the apps’
privacy policies state that they may sell collected data to third parties for
research purposes.247  To remove questions regarding applicability, the
Georgia law could be amended to apply to all natural or legal persons who
collect, assemble, evaluate, or transfer personal information regardless of
when or whether any remuneration is involved.
243 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g) (West 2019).
244 ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(6)(a)(4) (2019).
245 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (West 2019).
246 Id. § 10-1-911(2)–(3).
247 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions of Use, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme
.com/about/user_agreement (last visited Sept. 9, 2019); Under Armour Privacy Policy, supra
note 69.
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Still other state laws require a person or entity to be “doing business” or
“conducting business” in the state before regulation occurs.  New Hamp-
shire’s law, for example, applies to “any person doing business in [New
Hampshire].”248  Arizona’s law similarly requires a person to be “con-
duct[ing] business” in Arizona for the regulation to apply.249  Some states
loosely define “doing business” or “conducting business” to include owning
or using personal information of a state resident even if the person or entity
doing the owning or using does not have a physical presence in the state.
Indiana’s law, for example, defines “[d]oing business in Indiana” as “owning
or using the personal information of an Indiana resident for commercial pur-
poses.”250  Recall that Kinsey Reporter is based in Indiana, ActiveDay in
Washington, PatientsLikeMe in Massachusetts, and MyFitnessPal in Mary-
land.251  The companies that created these apps may not have employees or
physical presences in all states; however, they are capable of collecting data
from residents of all states through their mobile apps.
Unlike Indiana, however, some states regulate persons or entities “doing
business” or “conducting business” in that state, but they fail to clarify
whether the collection and use of data regarding a state resident (without
more) meets that standard.252  As a result, a broad definition of “doing busi-
ness”—similar to that set forth in the Indiana law—is desirable when viewed
from the perspective of a participant in mobile-app-mediated research con-
ducted by a researcher located outside the state in which the participant
resides.  For example, North Carolina has crafted language that regulates
traditional, brick-and-mortar businesses in North Carolina, as well as mobile-
app-mediated researchers.  In particular, North Carolina regulates “[a]ny
business that conducts business in North Carolina,” as well as “any business
that maintains or otherwise possesses personal information of a resident of
North Carolina.”253  The second clause in the prior sentence would cover
independent scientists located outside North Carolina whose mobile apps
collect data from North Carolina residents.
More broadly, some states’ breach notification laws apply to government
agencies, large corporations, or other specific institutions, but not necessarily
to natural persons.  Illinois’s law, for example, applies to a “data collector,”
defined to include “government agencies, public and private universities, pri-
vately and publicly held corporations, financial institutions, retail operators,
248 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20(I) (2019).
249 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(A) (2019).
250 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-4 (West 2019).
251 See supra Sections I.A–D.
252 See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2019) (applying Pennsylvania’s
breach notification law to an entity, defined as an individual or a business “doing business”
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but not clarifying whether collecting data from a
Pennsylvania resident without more is “doing business”); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 359-C:20 (2019) (applying New Hampshire’s breach notification law to “any person
doing business in [New Hampshire],” but not clarifying whether collecting data from a
New Hampshire resident without more is “doing business”).
253 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-64 (West 2019).
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and any other [business] entity that, for any purpose, handles, collects, dis-
seminates, or otherwise deals with nonpublic personal information.”254
Other state laws, however, specifically apply to natural persons.255  Given that
many independent scientists are natural persons without governmental, cor-
porate, or institutional status or affiliation, this Article strongly recommends
that states include natural persons in their list of regulated entities.
Finally, most of the breach notification laws appear not to have contem-
plated the collection of data by mobile apps.  However, at least one state did.
Illinois’s Personal Information Protection Act defines protected “[m]edical
information” to include information regarding an individual’s physical or
mental health condition, including “information provided to a . . . mobile
application.”256
B. State Security Laws
Moving from breach notification laws to security laws, more than two-
thirds of states have at least one potentially applicable data security statute.257
These security provisions were typically either part of the same acts that estab-
lished the states’ breach notification provisions or codified near the states’
breach notification provisions.  In some cases, the persons and entities that
are regulated by the security provisions are the same as those regulated by
the breach notification provisions.258  In other cases, the persons and entities
regulated by the security provisions are different than those regulated by the
breach notification provisions.259  In either case, this Article’s prior recom-
mendations regarding the persons and entities regulated by breach notifica-
tion provisions also apply to the persons and entities regulated by security
provisions.  For example, a security provision that only applies to a govern-
ment agency or a large corporation should be amended so that it also applies
to a natural person.  By further example, a security provision that only
applies to a person or entity doing business in the state should be amended
254 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5, 530/10 (West 2019).
255 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-9 (West 2019) (defining person as an individual
as well as a corporation).
256 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5 (West 2019) (defining “[p]ersonal information,”
which internally references the definition of “[m]edical information”).
257 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 218.
258 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-104 to -105 (West 2019) (setting forth a modest
security law that applies to persons and businesses, which are also regulated by Arkansas’s
breach notification law).
259 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.48.010, .090, .500 (West 2019) (setting forth a
security law that applies to businesses and government agencies but not persons with more
than ten employees, even though persons with more than ten employees are governed by
Alaska’s breach notification law).
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to clarify that owning or using personal data of a state resident constitutes
doing business in the state.
What is notable about some of the security statutes is how modest they
are when compared to the HIPAA Security Rule and the GDPR.  For exam-
ple, Alaska’s security provision requires businesses and governmental agen-
cies to “take all reasonable measures necessary to protect against
unauthorized access to or use of records” when “disposing of records that
contain personal information.”260  The law also states that reasonable mea-
sures include
(1) implementing and monitoring compliance with policies and procedures
that require the burning, pulverizing, or shredding of paper documents con-
taining personal information so that the personal information cannot practi-
cably be read or reconstructed;
(2) implementing and monitoring compliance with policies and procedures
that require the destruction or erasure of electronic media and other
nonpaper media containing personal information so that the personal infor-
mation cannot practicably be read or reconstructed;
(3) after due diligence, entering into a written contract with a third party
engaged in the business of record destruction to dispose of [such]
records . . . .”261
Far from a comprehensive security law, Alaska’s law may be properly clas-
sified as a “secure-disposal” or “secure-destruction” law.  The law does not
mandate any administrative, technical, or physical safeguards outside the
context of the disposal or destruction of personal information.  The law does
not address, for example, the need for security policies and procedures
addressing nondisposed data; the designation of a data security officer to
oversee implementation of and compliance with such policies and proce-
dures with respect to nondisposed data; encryption; access controls; or identi-
fying and responding to suspected or known security incidents involving
nondisposed data.
In contrast, one state (Oregon) not only requires the development,
implementation, and maintenance of reasonable security safeguards, but also
specifies exactly how that requirement can be satisfied, including by specify-
ing particular administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that must be
adopted.262  A second state (Massachusetts) has delegated to a state agency
the duty to promulgate comprehensive security standards, a task the agency
260 Id. § 45.48.500.
261 Id. § 45.48.510.  More than two dozen additional state statutes contain similar
secure-disposal or secure-destruction standards, including Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 218.
262 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622 (West 2019).
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completed with gusto by its stated deadline.263  A third state (Ohio) has a
cybersecurity act that went into effect on November 2, 2018.264  The Ohio
legislation creates an affirmative defense for any covered entity that creates,
maintains, and complies with a written cybersecurity program that includes
comprehensive physical, technical, and administrative safeguards, which are
set forth in the legislation, thus encouraging covered entities to implement
comprehensive data security programs.265  This Article recommends that
states with modest secure-disposal statutes and states without data security
statutes consider the data security approaches of Oregon, Massachusetts, and
Ohio.
C. State Privacy Laws
Moving from state security statutes to state privacy statutes, less than one-
third of states have at least one data privacy statute that is potentially applica-
ble to independent scientists who conduct mobile-app-mediated research.266
Three of these state laws may be properly classified as “online privacy policy
laws.”  The California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) is an illustra-
tive example.  CalOPPA requires an operator of a commercial website or
online service that collects personally identifiable information about
residents of California who visit the operator’s website or use the operator’s
online service to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the website or make it
available through the online service.267  Among other requirements, the pri-
vacy policy must (1) identify the categories of personally identifiable informa-
tion collected by the operator and the categories of third-party persons or
entities with whom the operator may share that personally identifiable infor-
mation; (2) describe any processes available for consumers to review and
request changes to collected personally identifiable information; and (3) dis-
close whether other parties may collect personally identifiable information
about a consumer’s online activities over time and across different websites
when a consumer uses the operator’s website or service.268  CalOPPA broadly
defines personally identifiable information as “individually identifiable infor-
mation about an individual consumer collected online by the operator,”
263 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 2 (West 2019); 201 MASS. CODE REGS.
17.01–.05 (2019).
264 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1354.01–.02 (West 2019).
265 Id.
266 California has four statutes, and each of the following have one: Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia. See sources cited supra note 220.  Other states have data privacy stat-
utes; however, they are not potentially applicable to independent researchers who conduct
mobile-app-mediated health research. See, e.g., Act of June 6, 2019, 2019 Me. Legis. Serv.
ch. 216, S.P. 275(West) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-a, § 9301) (regulating
only persons who provide broadband internet access services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 2446–2447 (West 2019) (regulating only data brokers, not first-line data collectors).
267 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2019).
268 Id. § 22575.
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including first and last name, home or other physical address, e-mail address,
telephone number, social security number, or any other identifier that per-
mits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual.269  Delaware
and Nevada have similar online privacy policy laws.  Delaware’s online privacy
policy law is forward thinking in that it specifically mentions its application to
mobile apps.270  Nevada’s law is more limited in that it does not apply if the
website or online service has fewer than 20,000 unique visitors per year.271
Mobile research apps that serve fewer than 20,000 research participants can
avoid online privacy policy regulation in states like Nevada.
Three additional state privacy laws may be properly classified as “privacy
policy false statement laws.”  These laws, enacted in Nebraska, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania, are embedded within state deceptive trade practices acts.272
These laws classify as a deceptive or otherwise unlawful trade practice the
making of a false or misleading statement regarding the use of personal
information submitted by consumers in a privacy policy, including an online
privacy policy.273
One state, Utah, has a law that requires certain persons to provide cer-
tain consumers with a notice of intent to sell their nonpublic personal infor-
mation before selling their nonpublic personal information.274  Because
PatientsLikeMe and other mobile health and research apps state that they
sell nonpublic health or research participant data, this law has important,
potential application.  However, Utah’s law is limited in that it only regulates
those persons that maintain an office in the state.275  Unless a mobile-app-
mediated researcher happens to have an office in Utah, the law would not
apply.  This Article recommends that the Utah law be amended to apply
whenever a data subject is located in the state, not when the data collector
offices in the state.
Five of the potentially applicable data privacy statutes276 may be classi-
fied as “human research laws.”  These laws give research participants certain
rights, including the right to receive information regarding studies in which
they are considering enrolling, as well as the right to consent—or refuse to
269 Id. § 22577.
270 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1201c–1206c (West 2019); see also 2019 NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN., §§ 603a.300–.360 (West 2019).
271 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.340(3)(c) (West 2019).
272 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-302(15) (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 646.607(12) (West. 2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10) (West 2019).
273 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-302(15) (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 646.607(12) (West. 2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10) (West 2019).
274 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -203 (West 2019); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.83–.84 (West 2019) (California’s “Shine the Light” law, which contains provisions
somewhat similar to the Utah law).
275 UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-37-102 (West 2019).
276 Other states have research laws that are limited in application to certain classes of
researchers (e.g., physician researchers) or research conducted in certain contexts (e.g.,
hospital-based research). See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.1(a) (West 2019) (apply-
ing to only physician researchers and hospital-based research).
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consent—to research participation, including the use and disclosure of their
data for research purposes.  In particular, Maryland’s research law prohibits a
person from “conduct[ing] research using a human subject unless the per-
son conducts the research in accordance with the [Federal Common
Rule].”277  (The Common Rule requires an institutional review board to
ensure that researchers adequately protect research-participant privacy and
research-data confidentiality.)278  New Jersey’s research law sets forth
detailed requirements relating to the consent form and the consent-to-
research process.279  Virginia’s research law requires researchers not subject
to the Federal Common Rule (which some mobile-app-mediated researchers
are not) to obtain the “legally effective informed consent” of a human
research subject280 prior to the use or disclosure of their data for research
purposes.  None of these statutes waives its disclosure or consent require-
ments in the context of online or mobile-app-mediated research.
The remaining two human research laws may not apply to all mobile-
app-mediated research projects, although they are useful for policymakers to
consider for drafting purposes.  New York’s law, which requires review and
approval of research protocols by a human research review committee, as
well as informed consent by research participants, only applies to research
involving physical or physiological intervention on a human subject.  The law
specifically excludes from regulation research on withdrawn or removed
fluids and tissues, as well as epidemiological research.281  California has a
similar medical experimentation law that sets forth a number of require-
ments, including the provision to research participants of a lengthy bill of
rights and the obtaining of informed consent from research participants.282
However, the California law only applies to “medical experiments,” narrowly
defined to include the “severance or penetration or damaging of tissues of a
human subject,” as well as the use of certain drugs, devices, and sub-
stances.283  Some mobile-app-mediated research projects will not be regu-
lated by the New York or California laws due to the research participants’
lack of physical or physiological involvement.  Note, however, that the
PatientsLikeMe study did involve the participants’ ingestion of a drug
(lithium).
The online privacy policy laws, privacy policy false statement laws,
“notice of intent to sell nonpublic personal information laws,” and human
research laws discussed above do not establish comprehensive privacy protec-
tions for mobile research participants.  For example, they do not establish
detailed data use and disclosure requirements, nor do they provide research
participants with a wide range of legal rights.  They also do not impose
277 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-2002(a) (West 2019).
278 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (2018).
279 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14-4 (West 2019).
280 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.18(C), .19–.20 (West 2019).
281 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440–2446 (McKinney 2019).
282 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170–24178 (West 2019).
283 Id. § 24174.
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administrative requirements on regulated persons and entities that would
support compliance with any use and disclosure requirements or individual
rights.  Two states do, however, have relatively robust data privacy laws that
are potentially applicable to mobile-app-mediated research conducted by
independent scientists.  In particular, Texas has a data privacy law that is a
slimmed-down version of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.284  California has a data
privacy law modeled after the GDPR that goes into effect January 1, 2020.285
The Texas and California laws should be considered by state policymakers
wishing to address the privacy concerns raised by mobile research apps.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Texas law is codified in the
state’s Health and Safety Code and is named the Texas Medical Records Pri-
vacy Act, which suggests (at least original) intent as a health industry law.286
On the other hand, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 is codified
outside the California Health and Safety Code—in the California Civil Code
instead—suggesting a broader, consumer-oriented intent.287  The Texas law
thus may be viewed (at least originally) as an intra- (health-) industry law,
whereas the California Act may be viewed as an inter- (or cross-) industry law.
It is no surprise that the content of the Texas law is modeled after the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, which is understood as a health industry law, whereas the Cali-
fornia Act is modeled after the GDPR, which is known as an interindustry
law.
The Texas law has extremely broad application.  The Texas law applies
to a “covered entity,” defined as any person who
(A) for commercial, financial, or professional gain, monetary fees, or dues,
or on a cooperative, nonprofit, or pro bono basis, engages, in whole or in
part, and with real or constructive knowledge, in the practice of assembling,
collecting, analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or transmitting protected
health information.  The term includes a business associate, health care
payer, governmental unit, information or computer management entity,
school, health researcher, health care facility, clinic, health care provider, or
person who maintains an Internet site;
(B) comes into possession of protected health information; [or]
(C) obtains or stores protected health information . . . .288
Mobile-app-mediated health researchers would constitute health researchers
under the first clause of the definition.  They would also come into posses-
sion of protected health information under the second, alternate clause of
the definition.  The Texas law, as written and without any necessary amend-
ments, would thus regulate all mobile-app-mediated health researchers.
284 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 181.001–.207 (West 2019).
285 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55, A.B. 375
(West) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198) (effective Jan. 1, 2020),
amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B. 1121 (West).
286 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 181.001–.207 (West 2019).
287 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100–.198).
288 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(A)–(C) (West 2019).
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Note that mobile-app developers as well as backend data storage companies,
which frequently obtain or store protected health information from or for
mobile-app-mediated researchers,289 would also fit into the second and third
alternate clauses of the definition of covered entity.  For these reasons, this
Article strongly recommends the Texas definition of covered entity.
The Texas law contains a number of important privacy provisions that
are the same as, or similar to, the use and disclosure requirements, the indi-
vidual rights, and the administrative requirements set forth in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.  That is, the Texas law requires covered entities to (1) provide
notice to any individual whose protected health information will be electroni-
cally disclosed by the covered entity; (2) not electronically disclose an individ-
ual’s protected health information without a separate, prior authorization
from the individual; (3) not disclose an individual’s protected health infor-
mation in exchange for direct or indirect remuneration; (4) obtain a clear
and unambiguous permission in written or electronic form before using or
disclosing an individual’s protected health information for marketing pur-
poses; and (5) train their employees regarding their data privacy responsibili-
ties.290  The Texas Attorney General, who has the authority to seek injunctive
relief and to impose civil penalties for violations of the law, actively enforces
the law.291
At this point, it may be helpful to review the hypothetical that opened
this Article to see how comprehensive and applicable Texas’s privacy law is.
In the hypothetical that opened this Article, a woman with a progressive neu-
rological condition, who wished to advance the scientific understanding of
her disease, volunteered to participate in a disease progression research
study led by an independent scientist.  The study required the woman to
download and use a mobile app that was designed by the independent scien-
tist and that collected a number of data elements, including first and last
name, date of birth, race, ethnicity, diagnosis, medications, family history,
and real-time information regarding balance, gait, vision, cognition, and
other measures of disease progression.
During the research study, remember that the independent scientist
electronically disclosed the woman’s identifiable data to other researchers
worldwide without the woman’s prior notification or authorization.  How-
ever, the Texas law would have prohibited both the electronic disclosure and
the lack of prior notification to the woman of the disclosure.  Remember that
the independent scientist also sold the woman’s name, address, and diagno-
sis to a healthcare marketing company.  However, the Texas law would have
prohibited this sale of identifiable health information.  The hypothetical also
289 See Moore et al., supra note 3 (providing data regarding mobile-app-mediated
researchers who use third-party, backend data collection and/or storage companies).
290 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 181.101, .152–.154 (West 2019).
291 Id. § 181.201; see also OFFICE OF THE TEX. ATTORNEY GEN., TEXAS MEDICAL RECORDS
PRIVACY ACT ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 3–4 (2016) (summarizing the Texas
Attorney General’s substantial enforcement activities relating to the Texas Medical
Records Privacy Act).
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involved a hacker who accessed the woman’s data as the data traveled from
the woman’s smart phone to the scientist’s contracted backend data collec-
tor.  Remember that the scientist neither notified the woman of this security
breach nor provided her with instructions regarding how to minimize her
potential economic, dignitary, and psychological injuries associated with the
breach.  However, Texas’s breach notification law, which applies to any “per-
son,”292 would have required the scientist to follow a number of important
and helpful breach notification procedures.  In summary, Texas has compre-
hensive privacy, security, and breach notification provisions that, if complied
with, would have prevented the woman’s informational injuries or helped to
minimize such injuries.  One important finding of this Article, then, is that
states like Texas have the current infrastructure necessary to address the pri-
vacy- and security-related concerns raised by independent, mobile-app-medi-
ated health research.
Now let us turn to California, the second state with a relatively compre-
hensive and potentially applicable data privacy statute.  In late June 2018,
then-Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy
Act of 2018.293  To be codified in the state’s Civil Code, the Act will become
effective January 1, 2020.294  The Act’s legislative history details the many
reasons for the legislation, including the increase in the amount of personal
information, including health information, shared by California consumers
and the need to give California consumers control over the collection, use,
and disclosure of their personal information.295
One catch with the California Act is that it does not apply to anyone who
comes into possession of, or anyone who stores or collects, identifiable health
information like the Texas law does.  The California Act only applies to a
business, defined as a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability com-
pany, corporation, association, or other legal entity that is organized or oper-
ated for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners,
that (1) collects consumers’ personal information and determines the pur-
poses and means of processing of consumer information; (2) does business
in California; and (3) satisfies one or more of the following thresholds: (a)
has annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; (b) annually buys,
receives, sells, or shares for commercial purposes the personal information of
50,000 or more consumers or households; or (c) derives fifty percent or
more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal
information.296
A postenactment amendment (SB 1121, signed into law on September
23, 2018), clarifies that the California Act does not protect data obtained
292 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (West 2019).
293 See 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55, A.B. 375 (West) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100–.198) (effective Jan. 1, 2020), amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B.
1121 (West).
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
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during clinical trials.297  In addition, many independent scientists may not
reach the financial thresholds set forth in the law; that is, they may not have
gross annual revenues in excess of $25 million; they may never conduct a
research project that uses the data of 50,000 or more research participants;
and they may not derive fifty percent or more of their revenues from selling
consumers’ personal information.  For these reasons, this Article does not
recommend that other states use the California Act—at least its application
provision—as a model.
Once the California Act applies, however, it broadly protects personal
information, defined to include medical information, geolocation data, and
a wide variety of behaviors, preferences, and trends, which are frequently
collected by mobile research apps and other big data capture tools.  In addi-
tion, the Act gives consumers a number of information rights that are the
same as, or similar to, the rights set forth in the GDPR.  These include, but
are not limited to, the rights to (1) request that a business that collects a
consumer’s personal information disclose to that consumer the categories
and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected, the
business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling the personal infor-
mation, and the categories of third parties with whom the business discloses
personal information; (2) direct a business that sells personal information
about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s personal infor-
mation (the right to “opt out”); (3) not have businesses collect additional
categories of personal information or use existing categories of personal
information beyond that agreed upon in a required notice of information
practices; (4) request that a business delete any personal information about
the consumer that the business has collected from the consumer; and (5) not
be discriminated against because the consumer has exercised any of the con-
sumer’s rights under the Act.298  In terms of administrative requirements, the
Act requires a business, in a form that is reasonably accessible to consumers,
to provide a web or online link that a consumer can click on to opt out of the
sale of the consumer’s information.299  The Act thus places the burden on
the consumer to opt out of the sale of the consumer’s personal information,
whereas Texas law contains an outright prohibition on the sale of a con-
sumer’s health information.300  Other than its somewhat narrow application
provision, the California Act could serve as a model for other states looking
to adopt cross-industry privacy protections that are designed to keep pace
with big data.
297 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B. 1121, § 10(c)(1)(C) (amending CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.145).
298 See 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55, A.B. 375.
299 Id.
300 Compare 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735, S.B. 1121, § 10(c)(1)(C) and 2018 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 55, A.B. 375, with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 181.101, .152–.154 (West
2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 53 26-NOV-19 8:43
2019] going  rogue 207
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS
This Article has carefully discussed whether nonsectoral state statutes
may serve as a viable source of privacy and security protections for mobile
health research participants and other health-related big-data subjects.  In
particular, this Article has catalogued and analyzed all potentially applicable,
nonsectoral, data privacy, security, and breach notification statutes set forth
in the laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.  Contrary to prior
assumptions regarding the capacity of state law in this area, this Article has
found that all states have potentially applicable breach notification statutes
and that each of these statutes contains individual breach notification provi-
sions designed to put data subjects on notice of security breaches.  This Arti-
cle has also shown that, depending on the circumstances of the breach,
approximately three-fifths of states require notification to a state agency or
the state police, approximately two-thirds of states require notification to
consumer reporting agencies, and more than ninety percent of states require
a third-party agent, data storage company, data processor, data nonowner, or
data nonlicensee to notify the data controller, data owner, or data licensee of
a security breach.
This Article has further shown that most state breach notification stat-
utes could be used to protect mobile research participant data with four
minor changes.  First, state statutes that currently regulate only government
agencies, large corporations, and other institutions could be amended to reg-
ulate natural persons as well.  Second, state statutes that require the regu-
lated person or entity to be doing business in the state could be amended to
clarify that owning and using personal data of a state resident constitutes
doing business in that state.  Third, state statutes that currently require the
first name or first initial and last name of a data subject to be present before
data will be protected could be amended to allow other identifiers to be pre-
sent as well, thus responding to the increasing ability to reidentify individuals
with nonobvious identifiers.  Fourth, state statutes that currently protect only
social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, state identification card
numbers, financial account numbers, and credit or debit card numbers
could be amended to protect physical and mental health data and other
behaviors, preferences, and trends as well.  These amendments would create
cross-industry breach notification protections that would benefit more health
data subjects (including mobile health research participants) from all infor-
mational injuries, not just economic injuries associated with traditional iden-
tity theft.
This Article has found that fewer states have potentially applicable secur-
ity and privacy statutes.  In particular, approximately two-thirds of states have
at least one potentially applicable data security statute.  These security provi-
sions tend to be extremely modest when compared to federal and interna-
tional industry standards.  For example, they briefly address the secure
disposal of data but fail to address the security of maintained, or nondis-
posed, data.  Those states that extend security requirements to nondisposed
data tend to require “appropriate and reasonable safeguards” but fail to spec-
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ify what those safeguards should be and when they would be considered
appropriate or reasonable.  That said, a handful of states, including Ohio,
Oregon, and Massachusetts, do have comprehensive security laws, and this
Article recommends the use of these security laws as a guide for other states.
Finally, approximately one-quarter of states have at least one data privacy
statute that is potentially applicable to independent scientists who conduct
mobile-app-mediated research.  These statutes include modest online privacy
policy laws, privacy policy false statement laws, notice of intent to sell non-
public personal information laws, and human research laws.  However, Texas
and California have robust data privacy laws that should be considered, in
whole or in part, by other states for use in protecting against informational
injuries associated with mobile-app-mediated health research.
* * *
Although sectoral approaches to privacy and security made sense as late
as a quarter of a century ago, when most data originated in the industry to
which it pertained, the time has come for generally applicable forms of data
protection.  Traditional, intraindustry approaches to privacy and security reg-
ulation certainly have some benefits.  One is regulator familiarity with the
information practices of the regulated entity.  For example, state medical
boards, which are composed of state-licensed physicians, are very familiar
with the information practices of other state-licensed physicians, whom they
regulate.  The HHS, by further example, is familiar with the information
practices of healthcare providers that electronically submit claims to HHS
programs, including Medicare and Medicaid.
It is not clear, however, that regulator comfort and other benefits of
intraindustry regulation continue to outweigh the risks of limited regulatory
authority.  Today, health data is generated not only by traditional members
of the healthcare industry, including healthcare providers, health plans, and
healthcare clearinghouses, but also by independent scientists as well as a
range of other individuals and institutions, including data subjects them-
selves.  The significant economic, dignitary, and psychological harms associ-
ated with health data breaches and the lack of applicable federal regulations
suggest a need for comprehensive and generally applicable privacy, security,
and breach notification regulation.
In light of the findings presented in this Article, policymakers should
consider nonsectoral state statutes as a possible option for protecting health
data if generally applicable, federal data laws are not enacted or enforced.
Because all fifty-one jurisdictions have data breach notification statutes, and
more than two-thirds have nearby security statutes, one option for states is to
(1) amend existing breach notification statutes in accordance with the guide-
lines set forth in this Article and (2) use the security statutes of Ohio, Ore-
gon, and Massachusetts and the privacy laws of Texas and California as a
guide for new security and privacy legislation.  From an academic (and
optics) standpoint, the security and privacy content should be codified near,
but before, the breach notification content.  That is, it is the development
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and implementation of privacy and security standards that minimizes the risk
of privacy and security breaches.
A second option is for the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to take the substantive recommendations set forth in this
Article and to draft a uniform data privacy, security, and breach notification
law that could be adopted or considered by all jurisdictions.  Because many
mobile-app-mediated researchers will collect research data from participants
located in more than one state, this option has the benefit of creating uni-
formity among state laws, which would greatly ease individual and institu-
tional compliance efforts.301  Regardless of the path ultimately followed,
regulation is quickly needed to address the rapidly growing privacy and
security concerns raised by big data, including mobile-app-mediated health
research.
301 See, e.g., Elliott T. Dube, Patchwork Privacy Laws Stifle Medical Studies Across State Lines,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 28, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences
/patchwork-privacy-laws-stifle-medical-studies-across-state-lines-1 (“Abiding by a patchwork
of laws during multi-state clinical trials will be expensive and time consuming and slow
progress in research and new treatments.”).
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